Alternatives International

Panama's Open-Pit Crisis: The Indigenous Struggle Against Mining

Salma Moolji — 2011-06-01T21:26:00Z

Dawn cracks with the swift motion of clouds cresting over the peaks of Panama's rolling cordillera. It is six am; the roosters are already crowing and the children, already crying in the indigenous territory—the comarca Ngöbe-Buglé. Nestled over three Panamanian provinces, the comarca is home to just over one hundred and fifty thousand Ngöbe, who constitute the largest indigenous population in Panama and one of the largest in Latin America. Despite the morning chaos, the restless beauty of Cerro Colorado's untouched wilderness is staggering. It is however, a beauty in imminent danger of disappearing.

Cerro Colorado, sitting at the heart of the Ngöbe comarca, is one of the world's five largest copper deposits. If exploited, the mine would expose an open-pit of six hundred and thirty square kilometers, leveling the mountain. Discovered in the early 1970s, the deposit was quickly contracted, prospected and subject to development. It was also however, a great subject of contention. Even in its exploration phase, the mining of Cerro Colorado was an issue strong enough to unite the indigenous Ngöbe. Their subsequent fight resulted in Law 10, which formed the comarca Ngöbe-Buglé as a semi-autonomous territory in 1997. Plunging copper prices in the 1970s and 1990s left the battle and the mountain behind—twice—but only temporarily. It was only a matter of time before Cerro Colorado would rise from the recesses of market memory and into the economically sewn pockets of mining corporations.

In February 2011, mining was propelled back into the Panamanian spotlight. Martinelli's government modified Law 8, which outlines the 1963 Mining Code to allow foreign state-owned enterprises to invest in Panama's mines. With a rocky history of American colonization still fresh on Panamanian minds, Article 3 of the constitution strictly regulates foreign investment. Yet, the increasing scale of open-pit projects requires more, and larger investors—a role that can be filled by companies owned by foreign states. Perched to oblige, South Korea's LS-Nikko Copper Inc. is forecast to buy a fifth of Minera Panama, and Singapore's Temasek Holdings Ltd. has taken an interest in Inmet's Cobre Panama project in Coclesito, Colón.

While legislation is specifically targeted at operating mines and secured concessions, some Panamanians saw the mining code change as a preemptive move to secure future investment in the mining of Cerro Colorado.
A torrent of protests swept the streets. Shutting down the Transamerican Highway on three separate occasions and crowding the gates of the University of Panama, Ngöbe, campesinos and students demonstrated, touting that they had not been blindsided by the government's move. Scurrying to unblock the road for carnival, Martinelli cancelled the changes to Law 8 and in a statement claimed Cerro Colorado would be “neither promoted nor exploited;” a skeptical promise at best.

The vast majority of Ngöbe people are profoundly against mining. Initial exploration in the 1970s left Cerro Colorado jagged-edged by terraces of removed earth. The seventeen communities immediately surrounding the mountain witnessed as the mine caused a series of fish kills, increased dust and pollution, increased noise pollution, contaminated their water and allegedly caused serious illness. Traditional agriculture was abandoned—crops grew poorly if at all. The new mine workers' camp brought an onslaught of non-indigenous workers, horrifying jobs, and quickly posed a threat to local culture. Even those that found employment at the mine site testified, “It was a horror to live; dirty, cold and hungry. Nobody wanted to be in that godforsaken place.”

One of the most concerning issues is that the Cerro Colorado watershed extends in both directions, to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The mountain is where the comarca's rivers are born. The San Felix River serves as the main water source not only for the comarca, but for surrounding towns including San Felix and Las Lajas. A traditional authority stated,

“Our only weapon is reason and strength in numbers with which we will confront the government to make them understand that we love, respect and will defend nature, because it is nature that we depend on. Not on arms or explosives. Not on tear gas, nor on police that oppress the people. We do not believe in this society, in the politics that Martinelli believes in.”

By exemplifying the negative impacts both socially and environmentally, it is not hard to understand why Ngöbe opposition to mining is so strong. Despite Martinelli's promise to leave Cerro Colorado out of Panama's mining industry, copper's skyrocketing price makes a tempting offer. Indeed, Corriente Resources Inc. has been operating training sessions in the region since 2009, through an affiliated consulting agency; Kokopelli. Kokopelli's directive is as a “stakeholder relations firm that works directly with industry to build sustainable, respectful and responsible relationships with Indigenous communities and other stakeholder groups.” Clearly, the Ngöbe of the comarca are a “stakeholder” in something, even though Cerro Colorado “won't be mined.”

International regulations stipulate consulting indigenous communities in large projects through the notion of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC; see Oxfam's guide to FPIC for more information). Kokopelli's training sessions provide food and promise home improvements as incentives to attend, in exchange for a signature. What people initially did not know was that their signature bore testament to “Ngöbe support” for mining in the comarca. Additionally, no concrete skills can be divined from the training sessions. This form of consent is neither free, prior nor informed. No information is given about the potential consequences of mining, only about its economic and development benefits.

Already starkly divided communities are struggling with the dichotomy of development. What Corriente Resources Inc. promises through Kokopelli could mean better roads, schools, healthcare and opportunities. The local Ngöbe NGO, Jandrän, supported by consultants, claims a fifty percent profit retention for the comarca is possible. This unlikely figure compares to the current regulation of two percent profit returns to Panama (changed to four percent by Law 8, which was subsequently cancelled returning the rate to two percent). The lack of honest consultation leaves promises empty and words simply words. As for examples to turn to, in Panama, the prospects are not good.

Panama's only operating mine, the Petaquilla Gold Mine, exemplifies the potential issues all too well. The myriad of problems range from contaminated water to skin diseases and pollution, from increased sex and drug trafficking related to mine workers to community divisions. This, all amongst the promise of development that, years later, has yet to come to fruition.

Yes, mining can bring development opportunities. In a region forgotten by Panamanian governments dating back to the early 1970s, someone has finally taken a substantial interest in poverty alleviation and development. Those that follow mining have the legitimate right to want such improvements for themselves. But with indeterminate possibilities, risks and consequences, it is difficult at best to make good, informed decisions.

Tensions in the comarca are at an all time high. Amidst a stream of constant protests and road blockings within the comarca boundaries, conflicts have escalated to car burnings and fake kidnappings from both sides of the debate. Now, the general sentiment is to extricate mining companies as quickly as possible.

The impressive roster of supportive signatures is artificially made longer by misleading Ngöbe. Martinelli's consultations with indigenous community groups are best described as a circus—a government-appointed ring master leading act after act of misrepresentation of the true community sentiment. The whole situation is orchestrated by false promises.

A council of representatives, the Coordinadora, has been meeting with the government to demand twelve points of change regarding extractive resource practices in the comarca, including Panama's ratification of ILO 169 which would strengthen their international legal rights. For now, the Ngöbe are not backing down: “A battle is coming, we know this.” If the real battle is not here yet, imagine the aftermath to come.

Panama City, Panama

Gender Mainstreaming in the South African Public Service

Nitasha Moothoo-Padayachie — 2011-06-01T21:17:00Z

In 1995, the mainstreaming of gender was identified as a key process for instituting change to the new South African democracy. South Africa ratified the Beijing Platform for Action, an agenda towards female empowerment, and made a firm commitment to the mainstreaming of gender within the Public Service by creating the National Gender Machinery. However, appreciation for the diversity between men and women still remains limited in most government departments, and the processes currently in place are not making much of a difference.

The process of gender mainstreaming is especially important in a participatory democracy, as it enables international agreements in the area of gender to have clout. Gender is widely recognised as a marginalised issue, and the UN defines gender mainstreaming

“as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated”. (UN/DAW 1998:4)

South Africa further attempted to pledge its commitment to the fight for gender equality through the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Southern African Development Community Declaration on Gender and Development, the African Union Protocol on the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, and the Constitution of South Africa which clearly stipulates the rights of equality. The latter came into effect in 1996. Following the Beijing Platform for Action, countries around the world set up institutions that would be responsible for the achievement of the aims of the agenda.

South Africa's National Policy Framework for Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality of 2002, also known as the Gender Policy Framework, reflects South Africa's vision for gender equality and how it intends to realize this ideal. The policy stipulates the overarching principles, practices and programs which will be integrated by all sectors of the South African government into their policies. This gender policy also details a strategy for gender mainstreaming and provides guiding principles for its implementation. Most importantly the policy details the long and short term mechanisms for determining the extent of gender justice and equality. This however, was undertaken in a very limited manner with many departments using the Employment Equity Act as a compliance measure for gender equality.

The National Gender Machinery (NGM), led by what was then called the Office on the Status of Women, was tasked with monitoring and assisting with gender mainstreaming initiatives in the South African Public Service. The NGM was composed of the Commission for Gender Equality (with members from the private sector and universities), non-governmental institutions, Gender Focal Points, and the Office on the Status of Women. The Joint Monitoring Committee for Improving the Quality of Life and Status of Women (JMC) was also set up to monitor the implementation of mainstreaming initiatives. In May 2009 a Ministry of Women, Children, Youth and the Disabled was established.

Even though the above measures were in place to monitor the process of gender mainstreaming, a report by the Public Service Commission (PSC) of 2006, “Gender Mainstreaming Initiatives in the Public Service,” revealed there are many challenges facing the Public Service.

There is a lack of knowledge about gender mainstreaming in most departments and across all levels. Senior management does not know how to move from vision (policy) to strategy and action. The main reason for this is because of a lack of knowledge and understanding of what it is that needs to be changed, why it needs to be changed, how to go about the change process, and what results should be produced. (Public Service Commission report, 2006:14)

A way forward was proposed by the Public Service Commission. The national government training arm was tasked with developing the Gender Mainstreaming Training program that would provide Public Service officials at the local, provincial and national level with the necessary skills to mainstream gender effectively. What has emerged from the rollout of the training program practiced since 2008, however, is that training is only one piece of what needs to be in place in order for gender to be mainstreamed effectively within government departments. Key institutional mechanisms are needed to support the mainstreaming of gender such as buy-in from senior management, allocation of resources (both personnel and financial), and political will. Policy must be accompanied by implementation that is monitored and evaluated; the Public Service must create a culture that recognizes gender as a marginalized issue. Gender must further not be recognized as a “women's issue,” and there must be a clear reporting strategy on the status of gender issues at local, provincial and national level, since South Africa's government model is a three tiered system.

Currently, the suggestion of a skills program is insufficient to elicit change. The South African Public Service needs to take up the baton to institute change in a holistic manner in order to honour its obligations to already ratified international agreements on gender, and for South African citizens to benefit from the mainstreaming initiatives of a Public Service that recognizes gender as a marginalized issue.

Johannesburg, South Africa

References:

South African Public service Commission Report, 2006
Rai, S.M. (2008) (ed.), International Perspectives on Gender and Democratization, Basingstoke: Macmillan
Gender Mainstreaming a Definition, available at www.un.org

Environmental Health in China: Poised in Ambiguity

Liza Ponomarenko — 2011-06-01T21:11:00Z

A rapidly industrializing nation, the Peoples Republic of China is simultaneously lagging and leading in the field of environmental health, which specifically addresses the physical, chemical, and biological factors impacting human health.

Environmental risk factors are much greater in China than in other industrialized powerhouses, and include risks associated with undeveloped rural areas and subsistence agriculture. In these areas, poor sanitation and lack of access to drinking water have caused the spread of a spectrum of diseases. Health risk factors in China also include soil, air, and food pollution from rapid industrialization, as well as post-industrialist epidemics such as obesity and hypertension. In order to adequately address, or at least mitigate the exponentially increasing problems, the Chinese division of the World Health Organization (WHO) has spent the past decade attempting to fuse environmental policy and health policy; two areas which have traditionally been managed separately within the Chinese administration.

The 2006-2010 Five-year Plan and the 2007 China National Environment and Health Act have finally shown progress in the merger of the two formerly disjointed sectors of government, environment and health. However, the availability of strategies to deal with environmental health remains fragmented at best, and not only in China. Bret Powis, a WHO Programme Coordinator, commented on the issue, stating that the lynch pin to progressive strides in environmental health is good governance.

There cannot be significant improvements if the infrastructure of the Chinese government is not conducive to the development of environmental policy. Thus, increased environmental health in China is dependent on changes in the fundamental constructs of the public sector.

Powis also noted that he found it easier to work with the Chinese government than other governments. He claimed he was very hopeful about future progression of environmental health policy, mainly because he felt that achieving long-term policy directives was much easier in communist systems. While this may at first seem surprising, it makes sense; a communist government does not drastically change over time. It is easier to coordinate with a constant agenda, rather than with changing agendas that waver depending on a political atmosphere.

In China, WHO focuses on two major strategies towards engendering the governance needed to effectively facilitate environmental health policy. As the Chinese department of WHO describes it, the first element involves “promoting the cooperation and collaboration amongst intergovernmental departments” and the second involves “identifying a clear division of responsibility among involved departments.”

While the objectives are admirable, their implementation seems questionable due to the ultimate priorities of the government. The Chinese government will always follow policy that allows it to retain absolute power within China and economic power outside of China. Among countless examples of this lies the fact that the Chinese government spends a far greater share of its budget on internal security than on national defence. Long-term dominance in environmental health policy will prove substantially beneficial for China, as it will not only make it a leader in the field of environmental sustainability, but will also legitimize its rapid industrialization by fostering moral gravitas. Yet at what point will that policy become beneficial for the Chinese government? Until this time comes, the lofty goals of the WHO will not come to fruition.

It is important to note that some components of environmental health policy progression in China are definitely more beneficial to the government now, and therefore will become realized sooner. For example, effective use of information and sustainable development are two environmental health objectives that the Chinese government has focused on improving for the sake of honing in on equity and environmental justice. The country quite obviously has an extensive record of human rights violations. How can there be social justice in a country of malleable civil liberties, dictated by the government on a whim? Justice seems especially foreign when considering the fact that anyone who attempts to challenge the Chinese government mysteriously enters a veil of inexistence. The case and point being jailed Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo.

A prime example of China's effective use and transfer of information is the China Climate Change Partnership Framework of 2008, which has just recently been finalized, and is entering stages of implementation. This framework is a joint programme with the Spanish government, which is committed to funding global efforts to combat climate change. China has been one of the first nations to benefit from the Spanish commitment. Mao Jixiang, the Environmental Health WHO Programme Officer, commented on the progress of this framework with great enthusiasm, and was excited by the fact that that this soon three-year joint venture is finally moving past the technicalities which previously hindered its execution.

The point of this venture is mainly to transfer the knowledge and skills necessary for environmental risk management among Chinese agencies, with a focus on the health sector. Of note is that nowhere in the joint venture are there specific datelines or targets. There are essentially only suggested deadlines which means the Chinese government can make policies as it sees fit. Meanwhile, the rest of the world must watch and hope for some kind of evolution in the Chinese environmental health policy.

The People's Republic of China is certainly a powerhouse nation. China will not easily bend to international pressure of any kind. Ultimately, the best way to make China enact environmental health policy, or any other type of policy that is beneficial to nations outside of China, is to convince the Chinese government that such a policy is also the best option for China. The WHO has been greatly instrumental in establishing and presenting such strategies, which have the capacity to strengthen China's economy and global clout while modifying the environment in the country to encourage better health for its citizens.

Beijing, China

Photos: Pedronet, fung.leo

The Controversy of Land Acquisition in the Developing World

Geneviève Lavoie-Mathieu — 2011-06-01T21:04:00Z

Global food prices soared dramatically between 2006 and 2008 and again in 2010, which signals a new era of uncertainty and rivalry in the field of global arable land.

Lack of arable land and fresh water, which result in agricultural change, are exacerbated by climate change and population growth. This is likely to have a snowball effect on food security worldwide. The recent price hikes resulted in widespread riots. The global panic was worsened by restrictions put in place by grain exporting countries such as Russia, Argentina and Vietnam to limit agricultural exports in an attempt to keep domestic prices low. The urge by rich nations to secure arable land abroad is on the rise to safeguard domestic food supplies. Where does this leave rights to land and fresh water in developing areas? Unfortunately, the relationship between foreign investors and developing country citizens is not one of equal opportunity.

According to the World Bank, more than thirty-five million acres of land were bought or leased in Africa, Asia and Latin America, where approximately eighty percent of vacant farmland is located. This land acquisition has sparked controversy as its sole purpose is to serve needs of investors, many of whom come from oil and gas-rich states, such as Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where water and food security are at “extreme risk.”

The route to this controversy is twofold. Firstly, the cost of leases or purchases is shockingly low, which appeals to investors seeking high rates of return. Secondly, most of the countries where land is bought rely heavily on food aid. Overall, thirty-five African countries are net importers of food. Agricultural investment could lead to important development towards ensuring food security in these countries. However, the focus of investment on export-led agriculture has made them vulnerable to price shocks on the international market and to currency exchange volatility, as reported by Olivier de Schutter, the UN special reporter for the right to food. As well, the risk of widespread hunger is heightened in regions where food resources are exported rather than consumed domestically.

Emerging economies, such as China, India and South Korea also aim to secure the resources necessary to fuel their rapid growth. To do so, they have looked into investing in countries with the most potential for irrigation to grow grain. Today, more grain is produced worldwide, but surpluses are much smaller. Such is the case in the US, where fertile land is diminishing and the nation is unable to keep up with its demand for grain.

Many of the land investment deals are sealed in countries that are in post-conflict reconstruction. Plagued by weak governance, corruption and a lack of transparency, there is limited screening of the proposals. Environmental Impact Assessments are rarely carried out, without which commercial farming and exploitation of land can lead to absolute water shortages. Investing countries are essentially exporting their water shortages abroad, as water rights are in most cases poorly, if at all administered.

Agriculture and the ability to grow crops increasingly gives geopolitical leverage. However, when the notion of land is intrinsically linked to the question of identity, livelihood and food security, can land be something you just buy?

A case study of Ethiopia, the Bechera Agricultural Development Project, presents the simultaneous dangers and opportunities of the “Land Rush” in Africa. The Indian company Karuturi Global Limited acquired 10,700 hectares of land from Oromiya Regional state for a period of thirty years to cultivate maize and palm trees without conducting a preliminary environmental survey. The report published by the International Land Coalition showed a lack of communication between the foreign investors and the local population, who failed to see the development they were first promised in the form of improved infrastructure and social services. Instead, the local community was displaced and unable to access water and grazing points for cattle. Furthermore, the process of land acquisition was not conducted transparently. As a result, the eighty-five percent of Ethiopians whose livelihood depends on agriculture no longer have sufficient surplus to export.

The negative consequences of commercial farming projects are numerous and include loss of grazing land and loss of wetlands as a reserve for biodiversity. The issue of water is also a main concern, as the hydrological conditions are affected in several ways. With mechanized commercial farming projects comes the use of fertilizers and pesticides in large quantities, causing chemical run-off that worsens the quality of water.

There are many recommendations that can be made towards ensuring that the land deals do not imperil people's livelihoods and food security. On the one hand, investors must promote local participation in economic activities and proceed in a transparent manner. Moreover, it is the responsibility of governments to clarify the nature of the deals and investment they want to draw. The population should be consulted and be aware of the costs and benefits of any future activities taking place on their land and how they will be shared. Social and environmental assessments are necessary before closing any deals, especially long term deals (lasting fifty to one hundred years) where the sustainable use of natural resources is crucial. In the same manner, purely speculative acquisitions should desist. Finally, greater efforts are needed in many countries to secure local land rights and prevent people from being dispossessed of their land.

Overall, the principle of free, prior and informed consent and robust compensation regimes should be a cornerstone of government policy and must be integrated in national legislation. Hopefully this will allow for the rights of developing countries to land and water to be respected in the international arena.

Berlin, Germany

Drugs & Justice

Davide Mastracci — 2011-06-01T20:57:00Z

In the last couple of weeks the outcry aimed at the war on drugs in Mexico has been massive, with tens of thousands descending upon the streets of Mexico City in protest. The desire amongst the masses is a unified one: justice. The Mexican people will no longer be butchered for the purpose of a draconian war which they believe cannot be won. The Mexican people will not accept America's tendency to spend billions of dollars overseas to fight terrorism while largely ignoring a war it has spawned in its own backyard. As Americans snort and shoot, Mexicans suffer.

Since current Mexican President, Felipe Calderon, declared open warfare on drug trafficking organizations four and a half years ago, thirty-seven thousand Mexicans have been brutally murdered. The casualties range from cartel foot soldiers to government officials, police officers, and even innocent children. All are sacrificed in the struggle to control the flow of illegal drugs to the United States; a lucrative market that provides highly organized drug traffickers with an estimated profit of $39 billion annually. This amount is nearly equivalent to five percent of Mexico's total economic output. The overwhelming demand for drugs in America suggests that the American government is losing its highly publicized "war on drugs."

Destroying or drastically reducing the demand for drugs in America is one of the three potentially feasible solutions to the drug crisis which Mexico and the United States can jointly undertake. Attacking the demand for drugs would undercut the business interests of the cartels while saving a great deal of lives on both sides of the border. Unfortunately, this option is also the least likely to be successful considering the American tendency to treat drug addicts as criminals rather than patients. Alternative approaches to drug addiction exist, and are being used to mitigate global drug traffic. For instance in Portugal the personal possession of small amounts of any drug is legal with the option of therapy for addiction instead of jail time. This policy, enacted in 2001, has reduced the use of once illegal substances by twenty-five percent according to a CATO Institute report. The CATO institute is a public policy organization devoted to the protection of civil liberties and restriction of government power. In the last forty years, over one trillion dollars have been spent on the American “war on drugs” in the form of threats, jail time, and destruction. Yet these expenditures have not altered the motivation of drug users to inject euphoria.

The second potential solution, which has dominated the joint efforts of Mexico and the United States, is the improvement of border security to prevent illegal narcotics from entering America. While essential to slow down the cartels, heightened border security cannot be a standalone solution. Border security manages to intercept just over thirty percent of would-be smuggled narcotics, with two hundred metric tons of cocaine, one thousand five hundred metric tons of marijuana, and fifteen metric tons of heroin still being imported into America annually. Furthermore, even if the drug routes from Mexico to the United States were completely closed, though Mexico currently feeds the majority of the drug demand, others like the Medellin cartel have held the role before, and with such an ideal product and customer, others would quickly attempt to fill the void left by Mexican traffickers.

Border regulation reform also tends to focus too narrowly on northbound traffic overlooking what is smuggled into Mexico. According to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, more than ninety percent of guns seized after raids and shootings in Mexico have been linked back to America where, in states like Arizona, a lethal arsenal of firearms are easily accessible. Although Obama declared in 2009 that he would increase the enforcement of laws which seek to prevent assault weapons from being brought across the border, he has not sought a reinstatement of the ban on the sale of assault weapons. The policy banning the sale of assault weapons was instated by Clinton in 1997 but expired under the Bush regime in 2004. This ban is one which Calderon has strongly pursued in order to reduce the fire power of groups like the Sinaloa cartel which have wrested control of Northern areas of Mexico from the government. The Sinaloa cartel is responsible, according to the U.S. Attorney General, for importing two hundred tons of cocaine and relative amounts of heroin to the United States.

The third solution consists of capitalizing off of the present drug use by legalizing the production and sale of drugs. The general framework of this argument calls for Mexico, as well as the United States, to legalize the sale of drugs in addition to the United States also legalizing possession of small amounts of drugs - something Mexico accomplished in 2009. Advocates of this method claim it would allow for competition amongst producers and sellers of narcotics thereby reducing the power of the cartels while allowing for a portion of the money generated through the market to go to the government.

This approach has been largely ignored by Calderon as well as U.S. officials, who insist upon continuing the costly war on drugs. However, Calderon's two predecessors, Vicente Fox and Ernesto Zedillo, have openly endorsed the approach. Fox went as far as to say that Americans benefit from the drug war due to the large amount of money invested in their country from the laundered drug money, and therefore ending the war is not a priority. While the cartels would still need to be pushed from power for drug legalization to succeed, legalization could ease the process of displacing the cartels. Fox explained in a statement that, “Legalization does not mean that drugs are good...but we have to see [legalization of the production, sale and distribution of drugs] as a strategy to weaken and break the economic system that allows cartels to earn huge profits.” Fox's pragmatism appears to make paramount the safety of Mexican citizens. “The question is not what is going on in Mexico, but what is going on in the United States,” Fox stated this May, referring to the large system drug trafficking that exists as much in America as in Mexico. Repeatedly pegged as a Mexican issue, the production and importation of drugs will only perpetuate if the American demand for cocaine, heroin and marijuana stays at its all-time high. As a multitude of laws and security reinforcements have failed to reduce Mexican-American drug trafficking, it is time for an innovative approach to ending the “war on drugs.”

Photo: Fronteras Desk

Anti-homosexuality and Africa

Erin Hudson — 2011-06-01T20:43:00Z

Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Bill came to life in 2009. Since then, campaigns for the passage of the bill and against homosexuality have occurred throughout Uganda as have protests against the bill. Throughout the lifespan of the bill, many responding events have occurred at a local and international level.

Earlier this year, four men killed Ugandan activist David Kato, his murder is widely seen as being due to his sexual orientation. In contrast to such hatred and aggression, this February Ugandan activist Kasha Jacqueline Nabagesera received a Martin Ennals Laureate for her work on behalf of LGTB communities in Uganda.

On May 13 the bill was shelved by the Ugandan parliament due to a lack of time to review it properly. The reaction to the shelving of the bill was mixed. Some feel that the continued existence of the bill is cause for concern rather than celebration, while others expressed that it was a victory that the bill was not passed by the current Parliament. The announcement to shelve the bill, victory or not, came days before the International Day Against Homophobia (IDAHO) on May 17.

At a time when the Anti-Homosexuality Bill is creating a stir throughout the world and directing international attention to Uganda and the prevalence of homophobia, the conditions of LGTB communities of other African countries are also brought under examination due to either geographic proximity or presumed similarity to Uganda. The examination of LGTB communities in a variety of African countries, with respect to the unique dimensions of the successes or challenges, is necessary for obtaining a non-monolithic understanding of LGTB peoples in Africa and avoid generalizations based upon headlining issues such as the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Bill.

When speaking with people working in organizations that provide support services and advocacy for LGTB communities in three different African countries, the impact of Uganda's legislation was varied. Speaking to country-specific circumstances each community worker addressed the conditions that rendered their immediate national contexts particular.

The Impact of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill

In Zambia, Chan Mubanga, human rights defender and director of the organization Friends of Rainka (FoR), affirmed that the Ugandan bill did have an impact on Zambian LGTB communities.

“There is more hatred now in our country from our politicians. Now they are basically parroting what is happening in other countries and bringing it here even without analyzing it [and] its impact on the people of this country,” said Mubanga pointing to last year's attempts to introduce legislation that banned marriage between two same-sex partners. This legislation was thrown out of the Zambian Parliament early this year.
“There's a lot of mimicking going on just between governments,” Mubanga said. “That's a trend in Africa right now; in our country especially.”
Mubanga explained how Zambia's upcoming elections have contributed to homophobia due to campaign tactics such as the opposing party's president being accused of promoting homosexuality.
Programs Director for FoR, Lundu Mazoka, elaborated on the political manipulation of sexual orientation.
“Zambian politicians, like most African ones have a tendency to look for scapegoats, socially and religiously contentious issues such as homosexuality draws attention away from their corrupt acts and infidelities,” he said.

“They're trying to win elections once they go to the polls. They believe, it's a Christian nation; it's morally wrong what we [groups like FoR] are trying to advance in this country. They've accused politicians of using human rights as an angle to promote what they term as ‘animal behaviour,'” Mubanga said describing the strategy behind political manipulation of homosexuality.

Gift Trapence, director of the human rights organization Centre for the Development of People (CEDEP) that works closely with minority groups in Malawi, noted a similar trend of politicized sexual orientation. When Trapence discussed homophobia, the term acquires meaning based not only on discrimination and stigma potentially attached to sexual orientation, but also on the Malawian political context. Pointing to critical issues in Malawi such as freedom of the media, low wages, and spies' presence in classrooms, Trapence stated that all these issues are brushed aside by politicians preferring to address the “gay issue.”

Executive director of Alternatives-Cameroun Yves Yomb noted the trend within governmental systems as well. He highlighted how in Cameroon's 2011-2015 strategic health plan to fight AIDS, males who have sex with males (MSM) were included in the plan, however, at the same time, he observed existing laws regarding homosexuality beginning to harden with harsher penalties being applied.

External Influence

International involvement in Africa regarding homosexuality has also had a large impact. Yomb said that the European Union's involvement in funding the fight against homophobia in Cameroon has provoked more homophobia than he had thought existed as well as bringing up charges of neo-colonialism and imposition of Western will. He referred to Senegal as experiencing a similar situation.

In Malawi, foreign aid is being withheld due to the government's homophobic and discriminatory practices based on sexual orientation. This stance has shown the intention of international solidarity for LGTB communities while also provoking a homophobic backlash against LGTB communities in Malawi.

Within Zambia, Mazoka explained that many politicians view homosexuality as a Western construct, thereby politicizing sexual orientation with many additional issues inherently linked to sexuality, such as national or African identity among others.

Religious Groups and Sexual Orientation
Trapence admits the possible influence that Uganda's legislation could have on the power dynamics of Malawi's laws that criminalize same-sex marriage, in particular considering the homophobia Trapence attributes to religious groups within Uganda.

“Maybe that's also why we, in Malawi, are very aware of religious groups that are very homophobic. We are also learning from their opposition in Uganda. There's that influence at the political level in Africa where we will learn from each other in responding to these issues,” Trapence said.

In Cameroon, Yomb outlined Alternatives' goals to continue advocating authorities for abolishing the penalties of Article 347 Bis and educating the public about homosexuality. Acting on these goals, Alternatives-Cameroun held a series of activities for IDAHO including a debate entitled To be Christian and homosexual: Is it possible?

“We don't want to give room for the media or other religious authorities who are the origin of the wave of homophobia in Cameroon at the moment,” Yomb said.

“Most of the media reports demonize homosexuality. They say it's ungodly, it's un-African, all those things. They use religion and culture to go against any other sexual orientation other than what is perceived as normal,” said Mubanga regarding the image of homosexuality in Zambian media.

Media Influence

With 2011 being an election year in Zambia, homophobic discourse in the media and in politics has increased. “The political environment has become a little too threatening for the safety of community members,” Mazoka explained.

Mubanga spoke of daily media reports lambasting homosexuality. While Mazoka described three of Zambia's largest daily newspapers, the Times of Zambia, the Daily Mail and the Post – only the Post is not state-owned – frequently giving a voice to anti-homosexuality sentiments.

“[There] have been nothing but derogatory remarks from politicians, and the media have been very biased,” said Mazoka. “In the recent deliberations on the amendments to the current constitution, Southern Province Minister Daniel Munkombwe said homosexuals are worse than dogs, this was during the debate on the age of consent to marriage.”

“With homophobia going around, I think people actually are afraid to come out,” Trapence said. He noted the difficulty in reaching out to LGTB communities regarding HIV-AIDS prevention as a result of this fear, prevalent homophobia in the media and the atmosphere created by Malawi's laws. Some of Malawi's laws include being imprisoned for proven or suspected homosexuality, and the most recent law criminalizes lesbian relationships.
Embedded Discrimination and Stigma
Yomb explained the current state of legislation concerning sexual orientation in Cameroon.

“Article 3467 Bis of the penal code is a law that punishes homosexuality. LGTB people are arrested and imprisoned not because they are in flagrant violation of the article but just because of slander, accusations, or because you are different from others, you can find yourself in prison for homosexuality.”
In Zambia, trans people are often victims of mistreatment by homophobic doctors and personnel throughout the health care system simply due to their visibility. Mubanga explained that whenever a group of over ten perceived LGTB people gather for any reason, FoR is required to inform the police. “Basically it's just monitoring and knowing exactly what's happening at that party or at that event,” he added.

With political and systemic obstacles fueling homophobic sentiments, organizing an event such as IDAHO was not possible in Zambia. Though FoR has partnerships with different national, African and international organizations, LGTB communities face challenges on the ground which can limit activism. With the 59.3% of Zambians living below the national poverty line, according to 2006 World Development Indicators, making ends meet demands the time and energy of many people. Facing economic struggles, most people, according to Mazoka, tend to look the other way and mind their own business rendering inter-country solidarity “non-existent.”
“Everyday living is lived underground. People are not openly gay,” Mubanga explained. He describes the oppression they face and the consequences he has seen as a result. “People are not able to be who they are and it is at times almost traumatic because most people are getting into alcohol abuse, drug abuse, [and] risky sexual behaviour just to be able to cope with oppression.”

The Future
Mazoka and Mubanga see raised awareness and widespread education as the sole solutions to the prevalent discrimination and stigma based on sexual orientation in Zambia. “Any kind of phobia is all about fear of the unknown, so once you make it known, I believe that people will be able to just move past the hatred and be more tolerant,” said Mubanga.

“Most of the homophobia experienced in Zambia is mainly from a point of ignorance about the community,” said Mazoka who explained that FoR has been encouraging its members to engage in advocacy through one-on-one discussions. Mubanga said he expected to see a change over the next five years with the coming-of-age of a younger generation that appears to be more open minded and accepting of different lifestyles.

In Malawi, Trapence spoke of his expectations for change. “Things don't just change in one day. It will take time for people to change their attitude or for government to change their laws. It's a process; it's a struggle but I hope we are moving in the right direction for talking about the issue in the community and [that] the community is able to talk about the issue.”
Yomb, who described Cameroon as not shining as brightly as other African countries regarding the quality of life for LGTB communities, spoke to changes he already has observed.
“It is true that the successes are not numerous, nevertheless the question of homosexuality which was taboo for several years is beginning to be the subject of conversations. The simple fact that we are already talking about it right now is a success.”

Death of Democracy in India, Birth of Censorship

Wendy Papakostandini — 2011-06-01T20:38:00Z

“What are we, Saudi Arabia?” asks Pushkar Raj, the general secretary of the People's Union for Civil Liberties in India. He adds, “We don't expect this from India. This is something very serious.” What Pushkar Raj refers to is the newly passed, highly controversial cyber law issued by India's Department of Information Technology this past April that restricts what content can be posted or made available to the public on the internet. Free speech advocates argue that these new rules are just excuses for the government to expand censorship in the country and further limit the rights to freedom of speech and expression that are guaranteed by the Constitution to the citizens of India.

These new cyber rules give the government and ordinary citizens the power to remove information that is “grossly harmful, harassing, blasphemous, defamatory, obscene, pornographic, paedophiliac, libellous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically objectionable, disparaging, relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever” [1] among many others. With the enactment of these new rules, popular sites like YouTube and Facebook must remove content deemed offensive in the span of thirty-six hours, and such sites may soon be blocked all together.

What makes the rules so controversial is the unclear, loose wording that makes them susceptible for abuse and misuse. What material constitutes as “grossly harmful” for example, and who decides what is “grossly harmful” and what is permissible? Due to the unspecific wording, almost anything can be labelled “grossly harmful.” These new rules are very much open to interpretation and the fear is that this flexibility will be misused, or used to suppress opposing views and opinions against the government. With social uprisings currently underway throughout Northern Africa, significantly aided by social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook, these new laws could be one way in which the government attempts prevention of a similar uprising in India.

With a booming population of 1.21 billion [2], India is undoubtedly the world's largest democracy. Freedom of speech is often considered one of the main pillars of what defines a democratic country and India's constitution clearly states that every citizen in India “shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression.” [3] However, these new laws bring freedom of speech into question. How democratic can a country be when its constitution promises one thing, but the specific laws and amendments enforce another? How constitutional are new cyber laws when they are in essence, limiting freedom of speech? When did democracy go from rule of the people, to rule of the minority in power?

Many claim that the new restrictions enacted this April will turn free speech for all in India into censorship for all. The new legislation makes it much easier for the government to quell uprisings or protests, for instance if state officials make claims of “harassment.” Furthermore, the government can suppress unwanted information about its actions since government officials can claim “invasion of privacy” or deem something as “hateful.”

In response to the huge wave of criticisms, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology in India defended these new rules by stating that “due diligence practices are the best practices followed internationally by well-known mega corporations operating on the Internet.” The ministry added that “the Government remains fully committed to freedom of speech and expression and the citizen's rights in this regard.” [4] However, the statement failed to include possible safeguards against misuse or abuse by the government officials, or the government itself.

In a speech earlier this month, President Obama stated that the United States will “support those basic rights to speak your mind and access information. [They] will support open access to the Internet, and the right of journalists to be heard – whether it's a big news organization or a blogger. In the Twenty-first Century, information is power; the truth cannot be hidden; and the legitimacy of governments will ultimately depend on active and informed citizens.”5 Although his speech was directed to the nations of North Africa and the Middle East, it applies to all nations, including India. India must address the questions of its public concerning the misuse of the new cyber restrictions and the implications it could have on their freedom of speech and expression. India must find a way to achieve the essential goals of the new cyber rules. Furthermore, it must do this without violating the liberties guaranteed to citizens by the constitution. This democratic doctrine is a symbol of India's independence, so tumultuously achieved in 1950, and must be adhered to.

Endnotes

– 1. http://www.mit.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/RNUS_CyberLaw_15411.pdf
– 2. http://www.indiaonlinepages.com/population/census-2011/
– 3. http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/coiason29july08.pdf
– 4. http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/05/11/india-clarifies-controversial-web-rules/

[1] 1

[2] 2

[3] 3

[4] 4

The Fate of Montreal's Community Gardens

Michelle Craig and Steve Richter — 2011-06-01T20:29:00Z

The survival of the community garden known as Faubourg Saint-Laurent is at risk and the city of Montreal has a choice to make: preserve the garden or turn the land over to high-rise residential development, bringing along deep environmental concerns for future generations. Montreal is at a crossroad.

This issue of whether a developer can claim public green space and build condos, apartments, stores, etc., is certainly nothing new. Cities and countries around the world deal with problems similar to these every year. Indeed, in 2007, the British government had plans to sell off some three thousand square miles of public land, including forests and moorland; the largest land deal in the United Kingdom in one hundred and fifty years. Gardens are under constant threat of relocation; if the City decides to sell the public land on which they are located or if the lease is not renewed on private land, vital green space can be up-rooted on a whim.

On private land the leases are long-term, either five or ten years, with the landowners getting tax exemptions. When located on city-owned, public land, the zoning designation can determine the future of the garden. A “park” designation ensures that land will not be sold, protecting the gardens from development. If the zoning is not “park”, then there is a possibility that the city may sell to developers. This is occurring in the Mile-End community garden where a condominium development adjacent to the garden may require additional parking space, thereby stopping the addition of fifteen new garden plots. This is also the case of the Faubourg Saint-Laurent community garden. If it closes, the city has offered to relocate the plots to Habitations Jeanne-Mance. Given that there is already a waiting list at this other location, the task of finding space for fifteen new plots is difficult. It is currently the second year of a moratorium issued by the city as they decide how to proceed with the Faubourg Saint-Laurent community garden.

Marie-Ève Chaume, specialist in public space and waste management at the Conseil Régional de l'Environnement de Montréal, feels that the uncertain future facing many gardens could be resolved by modifying the zoning to the activity. This would mean changing the zoning from residential or commercial to park if a garden is located on that land. This has already happened once in the Ville-Marie borough, so it could certainly happen again to preserve the Faubourg Saint-Laurent garden. All it takes is a commitment from the city to show that they care about community gardens in Montreal. The moratorium has given the city more time to make this decision and Chaume has positive thoughts regarding the outcome for the gardeners. She feels that they can sleep well at night knowing that they'll be able to garden on that land for a long time. But this raises an interesting question about the garden: namely, why should anyone other than the gardeners care about the future of the Faubourg Saint-Laurent garden?
Perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of mobilizing a resistance such as this one is to convey to the broader community why the garden matters to them—essentially widening the scope of the issue. It is a crucial question and deserves attention. Why should someone who lives in Villeray, NDG or Anjou, and who does not garden, care about Faubourg Saint-Laurent? It is miles away from their neighbourhood, so why should it matter if fifty or so people don't have a space to garden anymore? Some may choose to narrow the scope by claiming that the loss of a garden or two has little effect on the city while the development of a condo has a large effect through its stimulation of the economy. While we will not address the economic issue of bulldozing this garden, we need to ask ourselves—and “ourselves” refers to the entirety of Montreal—do we all rely on gardens and green spaces like these? And if so, how much?

Addressing these questions, Chaume responded, “I think that this garden sets a precedent. This could show how easy it is for a developer to buy collective land. [Furthermore] this is about the quality of life in Montreal. There are different citizens. There are different programs that respond to different needs and all of these needs need to be addressed and taken into consideration. The city needs to improve the environmental quality of life. Green house gasses and water issues will cost the city more when public green spaces are not a priority.”
This claim is definitely supported by many studies citing how rainwater is filtered through the garden, thus helping to keep ground and lake water clean. Studies have also shown that community gardens can use large amounts of organic waste as fertilizer, thereby reducing the community's need for other forms of waste disposal. Furthermore, according to the City of Toronto's Public Health and Food Policy council, community gardens are useful in providing impoverished people access to healthy fruits and vegetables. This can have wide-ranging impacts on the public health care system.

Although some express concerns about the gardens being placed on private land. However, the issue is larger than simply having a place for fifty or so people to garden. By saving the garden, we are defending the act of urban and community gardening and the principle of preserving green space in our city. It is true that the economic value of the garden in Faubourg Saint-Laurent is not greater than that of the potential condominiums, but there are substantial environmental and social costs of destroying this garden. In the area where Faubourg Saint-Laurent is located, a once heavily industrialized center (a brownfield area), pollution has been an issue for quite some time. If we let Montreal demolish this garden to build something that offers neither environmental benefits nor prospects of soil or water replenishment, the problems faced down the road will be far more environmentally significant than the economic growth of a single development company.

Montreal, Canada

How to Evaluate Progress in Bolivia

John Riddell — 2011-06-01T20:17:00Z

Six years after Bolivians elected their first Indigenous-led government, their ongoing struggle for national and social liberation remains a subject of debate and disagreement among socialists around the world.

Have the Bolivian masses been able to score significant gains under the government of President Evo Morales, first elected in December 2005? Or has the Morales presidency served to limit popular movements and block the possibility of significant change?

The second view is argued by Canadian socialist Jeffrey Webber in a new book and a variety of recent articles, including an interview published March 15 in The Bullet.[1] While Webber says that activists in the North should defend Bolivia against “imperialist meddling,” his primary concern is to disabuse First World socialists of illusions in the country's government. Despite Morales's “nominal inclusion of revolutionary slogans,” his actions involve only “relatively superficial policy initiatives,” Webber says. (Except as indicated, all quotations are from the March 15 interview in The Bullet.)

President Evo Morales and army chief Gen. Antonio Cueto inspect Bolivia's army after it was declared “socialist, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist.”

Far from moving toward socialism, Webber says, the Morales government has served to close off a “possibility of a fundamental, transformative overhaul of social, economic, and political structures” and to consolidate a “reconstituted neoliberalism.

” Jeffrey Webber has won international recognition for his writings on the social struggles in Bolivia, so his analysis deserves respectful consideration. His argument rests on his view – in my opinion correct – that Bolivia remains capitalist, and that a socialist transformation is not under way.

But surely that is only part of the story. The reforms that Webber derides as “superficial” have been violently opposed by the Bolivian oligarchy, who don't seem to agree that Morales is strengthening capitalism. The U.S. embassy in La Paz has participated actively in attempts to overthrow the government. Internationally, the Bolivian government has joined ALBA, the progressive alliance founded by Cuba and Venezuela, and has taken other positive steps, including breaking diplomatic relations with Israel.

In my view, Webber and others who agree with him are measuring the Bolivian government against an impossible standard, against the ideal program of a hypothetical mass socialist movement. If we instead consider its real achievements, the gains it has made against formidable odds, we must conclude that our priority lies in support of Bolivia's positive moves toward national sovereignty, social progress, and effective action on global warming.

Cochabamba Initiative for Climate Justice

 Webber himself praises one recent Bolivian initiative of world import: the Morales government's hosting of “a major anti-capitalist gathering in Cochabamba last year.” This was “a genuine step forward for the construction of international, eco-socialist networks,” he says.

Let us add that the conference, with more than 30,000 participants, provided a model of how social movements can establish an agenda for action by sympathetic governments. The conference also creatively applied an Indigenous perspective to the most urgent crisis facing humankind through its call for a “universal declaration of the rights of Mother Earth,” which has won significant international support.

Bolivia led an alliance of Global South countries in taking the Cochabamba resolutions to the world climate change conference in Cancun, Mexico, last December. There, Bolivia ended up standing alone in flatly rejecting an imperialist-imposed deal that again failed to act on climate change. The outcome in Cancun was a serious setback for ecological forces, but Bolivia, undeterred, is helping to spearhead organizing toward the next world climate change conference in Durban, South Africa, next December.

Imperialist powers are not accustomed to be defied in this way by a small Third-World country. Why did this historic challenge, the world's first expression of a mass anti-capitalist ecological movement, come from Bolivia, a small and desperately poor country, remote from the world's power centres, and weighed down with a historically fragile, dependent, and crisis-prone economy?

Agenda for Sovereignty  

To explain the Cochabamba initiative, we examine its context: a reversal in U.S.-Bolivian relations since Morales was elected. Bolivia has long been subjected to aggressive U.S. intervention, supported by the country's capitalist elite.

Previously, the U.S. utilized three extended campaigns – the so-called wars against communism, drugs, and terrorism – to keep Bolivian society off balance and to pave the way for various forms of intervention. After Morales's election in 2005, Washington turned to backing separatist forces in Bolivia's internal conflicts.

But Bolivia shook off these aggressive intrusions and has now has taken the initiative, rallying international forces against U.S. sabotage of climate justice.[2]

Webber tips his hat to this reality, noting that “the Morales government has also developed a relatively more independent foreign policy.” This aspect of its record is worth closer attention, however, especially given Canada's oppressive involvement in the region.

In December 2005, Morales concluded his first speech as elected president by repeating a slogan of the coca-farmers' union, “Causachun coca, wañuchun yanquis” (‘Long live coca, death to the Yankees'). Defense of the coca leaf, significant in Indigenous culture, against the depredations of U.S. drug-war contingents was symbolic of a new course to affirm Indigenous and national dignity. In the following months:

Bolivia broke with the previous practice of allowing U.S. ambassadors to influence appointments to senior government posts.

Bolivia refused to grant legal immunity to U.S. soldiers operating in the country; in response, the U.S. cancelled 96% of its support to the Bolivian army.

Bolivia broke with U.S. drug war policies and protected coca cultivation in family farms.

When Washington caused visa problems for Bolivian government leaders seeking to visit the U.S., Bolivia slapped a compulsory visa requirement on all U.S. visitors.

Bolivia cancelled the practice by which the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank had a say in the country's financial policies, and ended its dependency on loans from these agencies.[3]

The last of these steps was part of a package of measures designed to free Bolivia's finances from vulnerability to great-power economic pressure.

But Bolivia's most effective challenge of North American tutelage lay in promoting steps toward regional integration, free of U.S. and Canadian intervention.

Webber mentions Bolivia's “closer ties to Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba”: in fact, these ties took shape in ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), a plan for alternative economic relationships on the basis of solidarity, not the capitalist market, and simultaneously a political bloc coordinating member countries' resistance to U.S.-led imperialism.

The campaign against U.S. intervention led, in 2008, to the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador. In the Obama administration's third year, it has yet to negotiate terms for its ambassador's return to La Paz.

The main barrier to resuming normal diplomatic relations is Bolivia's strong objections to subversive activities of U.S. agencies within the country. Indeed, the Morales government has just expelled the Environmental and Economic Development program of USAID, a U.S. government agency that has engaged in protracted efforts to undermine the government.

Bolivia's campaign to free itself from U.S. tutelage and assert national sovereignty is an outstanding achievement, which was spearheaded by the Morales government.

Defeating a Rightist Insurgency  

When elected, the Morales government had “substantial room for manoeuvre,” Webber tells us. “The U.S. was overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan” and the “domestic right had been politically destroyed.” Instead of taking advantage of this opening, he says, the Morales government's policies, despite “superficial policy initiatives ... that run against orthodox neoliberalism,” remain “pre-eminently concerned with the restoration of profitability and the subordination of the working class.”

This picture is hard to square with the reality of social polarization during the regime's first years. Far from showing gratitude for Morales's supposed efforts to restore capitalist profitability, major sectors of Bolivia's capitalist class launched a violent rebellion, purportedly for regional autonomy but primarily designed to shatter the government's authority in the country's richest areas.

The rightist revolt was triggered by the government's initiative for a new constitution that would refound Bolivia as a “plurinational” republic, and by fear that Indigenous peasants would use their enhanced status and authority insist on return of lands stolen by white, mestizo and foreign elites.

It is true, as Webber says, that the reform of the hydrocarbon industry, which vastly increased government royalties, fell short of full nationalization. Also, agrarian reform measures have been less radical, so far, than those that followed Bolivia's 1952 revolution. Nonetheless, surely it is clear that, the present Bolivian government's reform measures – the assertion of national sovereignty vis-à-vis the U.S. empire; the new constitution; the agrarian reform, with all its limitations; rights and dignity for Indigenous peoples; increased royalties from resource extraction; etc. – were regarded as crucially important by both the rightist oligarchy and popular movements.

The manner in which this confrontation was overcome is instructive. The right-wing insurgency took the form of a political movement mobilizing in the streets and seeking to impose its will through violence – the characteristic method of fascism. For a time, much of the eastern region where the rightists were strong was close to a no-go area for government leaders and their supporters. Washington threw its support strongly behind the anti-government forces.

A capitalist government's standard response, faced with such a challenge, is to call in the police and army and impose its authority by force. If successful, such action in Bolivia would have left the army as arbiter of the situation; more likely, it would have led to civil war and foreign intervention.

It is thus striking that the Morales government relied not on the army but on the strength of social movements that had elected it to office. And far from resisting the government's supposed measures to subjugate them, the country's working people mobilized again and again to defend government initiatives against forcible right-wing obstruction. Fascist-type violence and provocation was thwarted through counter-mobilization, followed up by democratic consultations in which Morales obtained the backing of almost two-thirds of the voters. The neo-fascist thugs were isolated and marginalized. This historic achievement by Bolivian working people stands as a model of how to respond to Fascist-type movements.

Why Defend the Morales Regime?

 Speaking of Bolivia today, Webber states that “the popular sectors are rightly concerned with defending the Morales regime against any imperialist meddling and right-wing efforts at destabilization when they emerge.” This is a welcome statement. Still, if Morales truly represents “reconstituted neoliberalism,” why should he be defended?

Certainly it is true that the Bolivian state remains capitalist, and the government functions within the framework of deeply entrenched capitalist culture and social relations. It rules through a capitalist state apparatus that is ill-adapted to implement progressive reforms. It is often at odds with popular struggles – particularly now that gains against the rightists and Washington have opened more scope for such movements. Capitalist state bureaucrats have attempted to infiltrate the MAS, and turn it to their own ends.

But it is equally true that, through the victories of the MAS, popular movements have taken positions of authority within the government and successfully used this leverage to drive forward a popular agenda on many issues that the Bolivian people feel are deeply important.

In Bolivia today, Webber notes, “a situation persists in which there is no organized, alternative socio-political force to the left of the ruling party.” Surely this fact suggests that, despite all strains, the tie between social movements in Bolivia and the Morales government has not been broken.

A Revolutionary Opportunity?  

Webber regrets the “failure of the 2003 and 2005 mass mobilizations to translate into an overthrow of the existing capitalist state and the construction of a popular, sovereign, self-governing power of the Indigenous proletarian peasant majority from below.” He attributes this negative outcome to “the impact of the absence of a revolutionary party.”

Certainly, the presence of a broad, effective revolutionary organization would have strengthened the people's movement and influenced the outcome. Yet it is striking that not only was a revolutionary party absent (a not uncommon situation in our world) but that no significant group on the left posed a viable alternative to MAS's electoral project. How can this be? Was there something wrong with the Bolivian popular movements – with the human material, perhaps, or with their traditions? Or were there factors that made an all-out drive to overthrow the capitalist state less attractive than Webber implies?

The type of overturn that Webber describes – which I would call a socialist revolution – has not occurred since Cuba's revolution of 1959-62. Indeed, some Marxists argue that there has been no successful socialist revolution anywhere since 1917. This decades-long delay cannot be put down to inadequacies of revolutionary will or organization. It points to the existence of deep-rooted cultural, social, and economic barriers to implementing a socialist agenda, which cannot be overcome quickly or in a small, isolated sector of the world.

Moreover, we must recall the overriding lesson of the great Russian anti-capitalist uprising of 1917-18: to survive and flourish, the revolutionary alternative had to be extended internationally. That was true not just “ultimately,” as Webber states, but immediately. The failure of revolution outside Russia had a swift, devastating impact on the new workers' state that was keenly felt by 1919. Fortunately, Soviet Russia, which covered a sixth of the world's surface, possessed a range of raw materials and diversified industries sufficient to enable it to withstand several years of capitalist blockade and armed assault. Bolivia, by contrast, has an economy that is totally dependent on imports and exports, and does not have even an ocean port, let alone the backing of a powerful sponsor such as that enjoyed by Cuba during and for many years after its anti-capitalist revolution.

The greatest barrier to a socialist overturn in Bolivia is not the Morales leadership but the absence of workers' governments in economically advanced countries that could provide effective support.

The Morales government's focus on developing ties with other progressive or semi-progressive regimes – and even (to Webber's dismay) with other governments in conflict with imperialism such as Iran – represents intelligent revolutionary strategy. The ALBA alliance is an attempt to widen the options for poor, dependent countries, a project that, if it flourishes, will create more favourable conditions for anti-capitalist revolution.

As we know from experience in Canada, working people do not normally attempt to overthrow the capitalist state if the road to reform appears to be open. Revolution and the struggle for reform are not counterposed, but are rather part of a single process. A struggle for reforms can both strengthen workers' combative power and demonstrate the limits of what can be achieved in capitalism. Certainly, in Bolivia, events have shown that the path to reform did indeed lie open. The Morales government did not overthrow capitalism and does not appear likely to do so, but its period in office has been marked by tangible advances for working people and, also, has demonstrated limits of reform under the present capitalist state.

Metropolitan Responsibilities

 In terms of sheer drama and as a demonstration of the power and creativity of working people, struggles in Bolivia over the last decade call for close attention. Many writers on the left have studied this experience and expressed their opinions on where Bolivian workers acted wisely and where they took a wrong step. This process is natural and positive, and Webber has contributed to it significantly.

However, we must bear in mind that in the Bolivian drama we are not just analysts and critics, we are also actors. Bolivia's struggle for democracy and sovereignty has been actively opposed by the Canadian government and its allies. Imperialist intervention in Latin America is under way right now – to restrict national sovereignty, shore up reactionary regimes, overthrow defiant governments, and crush popular movements. It is an urgent threat that has Bolivia in its gunsights.

In another article, Webber has written,

“From my perspective, the first priority of activists in the Global North should indeed be to oppose imperialist meddling anywhere. This means, concretely, opposition under any circumstances to imperialist-backed destabilization campaigns against Morales. But the political situation is too complicated to end our discussion at that stage. Our first allegiance ought to be with the exploited and oppressed themselves, rather than any leaders or governments who purport to speak in their name.”[4]

Agreed, our “first allegiance” should be to the masses, but Webber's counterposition of the masses and the MAS leadership fails to acknowledge their close relationship.

Moreover, Webber's use of the term “imperialist meddling” radically understates the systemic nature of imperialist domination or the devastating violence of its intervention in countries like Haiti, Honduras, or Colombia. Imperialist domination is not expressed merely in “destabilization campaigns” – it permeates and defines every aspect of Bolivia's social, economic, and political reality.

In this situation, the “first priority of activists” is not criticism of the process in Bolivia, but solidarity – which must be expressed above all in opposition to Canadian government policies. In that spirit, all of us, including those who share Webber's dim view of the Morales government, need to contribute to the broad movement of solidarity with the people of Bolivia and with other peoples victimized by imperialist domination.

Endnotes:

 1. “From Red October to Morales: The Politics of Rebellion and Reform in Bolivia,” The Bullet, March 15, 2011. See also Jeffrey R. Webber, From Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class Struggle, Indigenous Liberation, and the Politics of Evo Morales, Haymarket Books: Chicago 2011; “From Rebellion to Reform: Bolivia's Reconstituted Neoliberalism,” International Socialist Review, no. 73 (Sept.-Oct. 2010); “Fantasies Aside, It's Reconstituted Neoliberalism in Bolivia under Morales,” ISR, #76 (Mar.-Apr. 2011); “Struggle, Continuity and Contradiction in Bolivia,” International Socialism, #25 (Winter 2010), “Evismo – Reform? Revolution? Counter-Revolution?”International Viewpoint, #382 (October 2006). For a reply by Federico Fuentes, see “Government, social movements, and revolution in Bolivia today,” ISR, #76 (Mar.-Apr. 2011). 

2. See Martin Sivak, “The Bolivianisation of Washington-La Paz Relations: Evo Morales' Foreign Policy Agenda in Historical Context,” in Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia, London: Institute for Study of the Americas, 2011. 

3. Sivak, “Bolivianisation,” pp. 161–71.

 4. Webber, “Rebellion to Reform”; also quoted in “Fantasies Aside.” John Riddell is an activist in Toronto Bolivia Solidarity.

Published in www.johnriddell.wordpress.com

John Riddell is a member of Toronto Bolivia Solidarity, t.grupoapoyo.org.  

Photo: Sebastian Baryli (Flickr)

Agricultural Livelihoods in Rwanda

Raïsa Mirza — 2011-06-01T19:44:31Z

Land is the resource upon which many Rwandans rely for their livelihood. The stakeholders in modern day agriculture are numerous. Farmers, co-operatives, NGOs, corporations and governments all interact to create a complex and dynamic sector that is vital to the social, political and in particular economic aspects of the country. This photo essay explores how land use change and new agricultural practices are changing the landscape of Rwanda.

Typical countryside

Rwanda is not called the "Land of a Thousand Hills" for naught. The entire countryside is dominated by undulating hills from the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on one side to Tanzania on the other. They are more than just a characteristic of geography; even communities are organized by hills, with people identifying themselves as being from one "colline" or another.

The steep sides of these hills are the only place that farmers, who constitute almost 80% of the population, can cultivate land and raise livestock. Terracing is extremely expensive and time consuming so it is not a common agricultural practice. Instead, families plant their plots on the slopes and have adapted the crops to the terrain.

Boy and Maize

An increasing population is putting pressure on Rwanda's farmers to increase yields within the same land size. Entire valleys where rivers once flowed are drained and converted into fields where maize is grown by local community organizations. In most cases, government incentives such as free high yield seed varieties and access to fertilizers are used to convince farmers to switch from traditional crops to maize production.

This maize field sits atop an area that used to be a river. Farmers complain that it floods during the rainy season. They need more help to build irrigation canals to channel the water away from the area.

Down In The Valley

What is the impact of converting riverbeds into cropland for the environment? Many agronomists agree that life is better with more room to plant food. However there have been no environmental assessments of land use change. Only one farmer admitted that there were now fewer species of birds than before.

Dry Land

Diverting and changing the course of an entire hydrological system result in serious environmental consequences over the short and long term. This is the bottom of a former riverbed. The water was diverted to make the bed suitable for growing crops. Dry land replaced what used to be a river and wetland environment.

Off with the trees!

Large trees are a rare sight in Rwanda. This family cleared the trees in their lot to enlarge their agricultural land. Deforestation on hills leads to the rapid soil erosion of the nutritious upper layer of soil. When trees are cut down, the roots that used to hold the topsoil together often collapse. Landslides are possible in steeper hill areas, destroying crops and houses on the way.

Gathering

Many farmers are part of agricultural associations or co-operatives. As a group, they have better access to inputs and fertilizers and have increased access to credit. Small social groups like this are a huge part of the Rwandan rural experience.

Maize Harvesting workshop

Many of the farmers in Rwanda are women. Some are members of more than one association or co-operative which enables the cultivation of larger areas of land in addition to smaller family plots. Local NGOs offer training workshops on modern farming techniques to farmers' groups. Agronomists follow-up with farmers throughout the season to ensure the proper tending of crops. This woman is attending a maize harvesting workshop.

Farmer

This is a typical Rwandan farmer. She is a woman, she lives in a rural area, she is a member of a couple of different associations. She uses cell phones to communicate with others in her group. As a group leader, she calls meeting and is the primary contact between visiting agronomists and those of her collective. She is a hard worker and is hopeful about the future of her country and of her children.

Show and Tell

In an effort to teach modern agricultural techniques to farmers, various NGOs have funded demonstration fields where farming co-operatives can come to watch and learn. This demonstration field was divided into two – one side used traditional methods of preparing the soil, planting and no pesticides. The other side used high yield maize seeds, chemical fertilizers and inputs and a deliberate spacing method to ensure optimal growth.

Monsanto Farmer

With the increase of farming maize in Rwanda, large agricultural conglomerates such as Monsanto have a larger stake at supplying the government with high- yield maize varieties to grow, fertilizers and chemicals. However, soil degradation and traditional growing methods are being put aside for techniques that might affect the population badly in the near future.

Disease

Diseases and pests are problems for farmers everywhere. For small holder farmers in developing countries, they represent a significant loss of income that can lead to food insecurity and malnutrition in affected regions. The Rwandan government promotes a select few varieties of maize through their agricultural programs. This makes crops more susceptible to the stress whereas a greater genetic variation in crops would allow for increased resilience against pests and disease.

As more and more farmers are encouraged to switch from producing traditional vegetables for subsistence towards harvesting maize for sale, the onset of disease or pests in a crop can seriously harm a family's productivity. To prevent such problems, fertilizers and pesticides are made more widely available to farmers at lower prices. However, over time, the pests and diseases will adapt to these agricultural inputs which will increase the demand for stronger products and further harm the environment (for example, by contaminating water, already a scarce resource in Rwanda as a result of climate change).

Sorghum

Sorghum, a traditional crop, is usually ground up and mixed with milk or water for a kind of porridge. Its nutritional content is very poor therefore the government discourages the practice of planting entire fields of sorghum.

Compost

Jean Paul is a professor of agronomy at the University of Butare. His team, with help from Texas A&M University has been at the forefront of the fair trade and organic coffee growing movement in Rwanda. Here, he shows how coffee husks are composted. The compost will be redistributed throughout the soils of the coffee plantations to increase nutrients in the soil.

Vermicomposting

Vermicomposting is also being experimented as a way to increase soil fertility and to reduce the amount of waste from coffee growing.

N2Africa

Felix is an agronomist for CIAT (International Centre for Tropical Agriculture). In partnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and agricultural organizations across Sub-Saharan Africa, CIAT has launched N2Africa.The project promotes the use of nitrogen fixating legumes as a way to increase nutrients in degraded soils. In Rwanda, soybeans are a crop that contributes to the fertility of soils. They grow prosper in arid conditions and on hills. Soybeans are also an alternative to meat products. Traditionally, cows are very important in Rwandan culture, however they require large amounts of food and space to graze. Soybeans provide similar nutrients to cows and are a cheaper substitute.

Democratic Science

In the N2Africa program, agronomists visit test sites a few times during the season to talk with farmers. Farmers in this agricultural association visited trial plots with different fertilizer inputs and voted on which characteristics they found most important. Most farmers do not consider the size of the soybean to be the most important factor in the genetic variety. They also need the plant itself to produce leaves and biomass to feed their livestock. The conclusion of the workshop would not have been possible without the exchange of scientific and local knowledge.

Packaging soy milk

Encouraging using soy as an alternative to raising cattle means showing women the potential of soy as a food product. The local women's association raised money to buy a soy milk packaging machine. Soy milk lasts longer and has fewer hormones than cow milk. However, the association used up most of its budget provided by NGOs on the machine. Less than a month after the purchase, the Rwandan government banned the use of plastic bags which made the sale of soy milk in plastic bags illegal. The women are now stuck with a very expensive machine they cannot use.

Eucalyptus Forest

Eucalyptus forests are a common sight in Rwanda. Native vegetation has been cleared away to make room for fast-growing eucalyptus trees imported from Australia and China that can also be used as firewood. The majority of rural households in Rwanda use firewood for fuel.

Land Use

Rwanda has three National Parks and Reserves. Akagera National Park in the Eastern part of the country is shared with Tanzania. The park is under immense population pressures which decreases the amount of protected land occupied animals. The park was created in the late nineties but large portions of it were given to returning Rwandans for farming. Although it is illegal to kill any of the animals of the park, some still poach animals to eat. The biggest problem of farm encroachment is that animals often trample crops that are situated on the periphery of the park.

Tourism is a burgeoning industry in Rwanda. Tourists have to pay a very large sum of money to enter any national park (and they do!). Therefore, the government is encouraging education programs and tourism as an alternative livelihood for farmers in the region.

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