Alternatives International

People United Will Never Be Defeated!

2015-04-04T14:06:12Z

Declaration of the Social Movements Assembly World Social Forum 2015
Tunisia, 27 March 2015

The Social Movements Assembly of the WSF 2015, Tunisia is the place where we come together through all our diversity, in order to forge a collective agenda to fight against capitalism, imperialism, patriarchy, racism and all forms of discrimination and oppression.

We have forged a common history and a common stream of work which led to some progress, with the hope to garner some amount of victory against the ruling system and to create several alternatives for a socially just development that respects nature.

People all over the world are suffering the effects of the aggravation of a profound crisis of capitalism, in which private transnational corporations, banks, media conglomerates and international financial institutions are trying to increase their profits by applying interventionist and neocolonial policies with the complicity of neo-liberal governments.

War, military occupations, free-trade neoliberal treaties (Trans-Atlantic, Trans-Pacific, ALECA, UE-MERCOSUR, APE, MERCOSUR-Israel and different bilateral treaties) and “austerity measures” are expressed in economic packages that privatize the common good, and public services, cut wages, violate rights, increase unemployment and precarious conditions, overload women´s care work and destroys nature.

Such neo-liberal policies have massive impacts both on the Southern and the Northern countries and contribute to an increase in migration, forced displacement, evictions, debt, and social inequalities. They re-enforce conservatism and the control over women´s bodies and lives. In addition, they impose "green economy" as a solution to the environmental and food crisis, which not only exacerbates the problem, but leads to commodification, privatization and financialization of life and nature.

We assert that the peoples are in no way responsible for this crisis and they must not continue to pay for it. We also assert that no solution is possible within the capitalist system. Here, in Tunis, we reaffirm our commitment to join forces to forge a common strategy to guide our struggles against capitalism. This is why we, social movements, struggle:

Against transnational corporations and the financial system (IMF, WB and WTO), who are the main agents of the capitalist system, privatizing life, public services and common goods such as water, air, land, seeds and mineral resources, promoting wars and violations of human rights, and ransack resources. Transnational corporations reproduce extractionist practices endangering life, grabbing our lands and developing genetically modified seeds and food, taking away the peoples' right to food and destroying biodiversity.

We fight for the cancellation of illegitimate and odious debt which today is a global instrument of domination, repression and economic and financial strangulation of people. We reject free trade agreements that are imposed by States and transnational corporations and we affirm that it is possible to build another kind of globalization, made by and for the people, based on solidarity and on freedom of movement for all human beings.
We support the call for an international day of action on 18 April, 2015 against the free trade agreements.

For climate justice and food sovereignty, because we know that global climate change is the result of the capitalist system of production, distribution and consumption. Transnational corporations, international financial institutions and governments serving them do not want to reduce greenhouse gases. We denounce “green economy” and refuse fake solutions to the climate crisis such as bio-fuels, genetically modified organisms and mechanisms of the carbon market like REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), which ensnare impoverished peoples with false promises of progress while privatizing and commodifying the forests and territories where these peoples have been living for thousands of years.
We defend food sovereignty and support sustainable peasant agriculture which are the true solutions to the food and climate crises and which also entail an access to land for all who work on it.

We call for a mass mobilization on climate in December 2015 in Paris alongside the COP21. Let's make 2015 the year of mobilizing social movements around the world for climate justice.

Against violence against women, often conducted in militarily occupied territories, but also violence affecting women who are criminalized for taking part in social struggles. We fight against domestic and sexual violence perpetrated on women because they are considered objects or goods, because the sovereignty of their bodies and minds is not acknowledged. We fight against the traffic of women, girls and boys.

We defend sexual diversity, the right to gender self-determination and we oppose all homophobia and sexist violence.

We call upon all people to support the activities of the 4th World March of Women during March-October 2015.

For peace and against war, colonialism, occupations and the militarization of our lands.

We denounce the false discourse of human rights defense and fight against fundamentalism, which is often used to justify military occupations. We defend the right to people's sovereignty and self-determination. We denounce the installation of foreign military bases to instigate conflicts, to control and ransack natural resources, and to foster dictatorships in several countries.

We demand reparations for all the peoples who have been victims of colonialism across the world.

For democratizing mass media and building alternative media, which are fundamental to overthrow the capitalist logic.

For resistance and solidarity, we fight for our freedom to organize trade unions, social movements, associations and all other forms of peaceful resistance.

We denounce the intensification of repressive measures against people´s rebellions; the arrests, assassinations and imprisonments of activists, students and journalists; and also the criminalization of our struggles.

Inspired by the history of our struggles and by the rejuvenating strength of the people on the streets, the Social Movements Assembly call upon everyone to mobilize and develop actions - coordinated at the world level – in a global week of mobilization against capitalism from 17 to 25 October, 2015

Social movements of the world, let us advance towards a global unity to shatter the capitalist system!

Let's strengthen our solidarity with the people of the world who fight everyday against imperialism, colonialism, exploitation, patriarchy, racism and injustice in Tunisia, Palestine, Kurdistan, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Greece, Spain, Burkina Faso, Mali, Congo (DRC), Central Africa, and Western Sahara...

Long live the people's struggle!

People united will never be defeated!

Netanyahu Deserves the Israeli People, and They Deserve Him

Gideon Levy — 2015-04-04T14:03:57Z

The first conclusion that arose just minutes after the announcement of the exit polls was particularly discouraging: The nation must be replaced. Not another election for the country's leadership, but general elections to choose a new Israeli people – immediately. The country urgently needs that. It won't be able to stand another term for Benjamin Netanyahu, who emerged last night as the man who will form the next government.

If after six years of nothing, if after six years of sowing fear and anxiety, hatred and despair, this is the nation's choice, then it is very ill indeed. If after everything that has been revealed in recent months, if after everything that has been written and said, if after all this, the Israeli phoenix succeeded in rising from the ashes and getting reelected, if after all this the Israeli people chose him to lead for another four years, something is truly broken, possibly beyond repair.

Netanyahu deserves the Israeli people and they deserve him. The results are indicative of the direction the country is headed: A significant proportion of Israelis has finally grown detached from reality. This is the result of years' worth of brainwashing and incitement. These Israelis voted for the man who will lead the United States to adopt harsh measures against Israel, for the man whom the world long ago grew sick of. They voted for the man who admitted to having duped half the world during his Bar-Ilan speech; now he has torn off his mask and disavowed those words once and for all. Israel said "yes" to the man who said "no" to a Palestinian state. Dear Likud voters, what the hell do you say "yes" to? Another 50 years of occupation and ostracism? Do you really believe in that?

On Tuesday the foundations were laid for the apartheid state that is to come. If Netanyahu succeeds in forming the next government in his spirit and image, then the two-state solution will finally be buried and the struggle over the character of a binational state will begin. If Netanyahu is the next prime minister, then Israel has not only divorced the peace process, but also the world. Piss off, dear world, we're on our own. Please don't interfere, we're asleep, the people are with Netanyahu. The Palestinians can warm the benches at the International Criminal Court at The Hague, the Israel boycotters can swing into high gear and Gaza can wait for the next cruel attack by the Israeli army.

The battle for all these has yet to be officially decided. The next prime minister will be crowned by Moshe Kahlon and the heads of other small parties. At the time of this writing, Kahlon has yet to declare his intention. The ball is in these parties' court; they will decide if Netanyahu continues. Most of them despise him, but it's doubtful whether they will have the courage to turn their backs on the public. That will be their test. That will be the test of their courage and integrity. Moshe Kahlon and Aryeh Dery, do you truly believe Netanyahu is better than Isaac Herzog for the society and social welfare you purport to care for? Does the country's decent and courageous president, Reuven Rivlin, believe Netanyahu will be a better prime minister than Herzog? There is a lot resting on his shoulders now – but the fact that a figure like Netanyahu and a party like Likud succeeded in maintaining power as the country's leading faction already says a great deal.

Netanyahu is threatening to surpass David Ben-Gurion as Israel's longest running leader. He is already in second place, and yet it's hard to think of one significant achievement on his part. The list of damage he has done is long. But he is the nation's, or much of the nation's, chosen one. That choice must be respected, even if it makes it difficult to hope for a good outcome. The only consolation is that another Netanyahu term will prompt the world to act. That possibility is our only refuge.

Gideon Levy tweets at @levy_haaretz

Source: http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.647555?utm_source=Facebook&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social

Bill C-51 Wants You to Stop Protesting in Support of Palestinians

Paul Weinberg — 2015-04-04T14:00:35Z

One of the less discussed questions of the Harper government's anti-terror bill, Bill C-51, is whether Palestinian rights advocates and advocates of boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) will be targeted by CSIS agents armed with new powers to target and disrupt, courtesy of a judicial warrant.

Admittedly, the legislation and its intended objects are vague, except that what constitutes "terrorism," seems to be broadening beyond wanton acts of violence.

So, we need to be on guard when Public Safety minister Steven Blaney, the author of Bill-C-51, also talks about "zero tolerance" for promoters of the international BDS campaign against Israel.

What does that exactly mean? We know that Harper and his Conservatives have cozied up so close to Israeli government and policy that there appears to be little daylight between them at the moment.

The extreme right-wing coalition administration led by Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu in the Jewish state is now in the midst of a hard fought Israeli election for March 17; and he has made no bones about connecting to "terrorism," any form of Palestinian resistance towards illegal Jewish settlement of occupied Palestinian land and the economic/military stranglehold of the Gaza Palestinian enclave.

After surprising news reports circulated Netanyahu's willingness to offer concessions in a peace deal with the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, the Israel PM has now sought to reassure right-wing supporters within the Israeli electorate that he is definitely opposed to a negotiated Palestinian state, arguing it would "fall into the hands of Islamic extremism and terror organizations supported by Iran."

How this jives with a January 18 2015 memorandum of understanding between Canada and Israel where both parties indicated a desire for a "peaceful" two-state solution negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians should be interesting to observe in the upcoming months if Netanyahu and his Likud party sweep to the election victory and lead a new rightist coalition.

Nonetheless, there is a consistent theme here and in other Canadian government statements of a hard line against BDS, which was originally mounted by Palestinians NGOs in the occupied West Bank after it became obviously apparent that armed struggle against Israel was not the answer.

The Harper government continues to echo the Israel government smear that supporters of BDS, which now includes scientist Stephen Hawking, South African bishop Desmond Tutu and journalist Naomi Klein, represent the "the new anti-semitism."

Just days after the signing of the memorandum of understanding, Blaney alluded to this claim during a bizarre speech before the United Nations General Assembly where he combined the murders of the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists and the attack on a kosher supermarket in Paris, the war against ISIS in Iraq and "zero tolerance" approach to BDS.

"The Harper government is shameless in its opportunism," states Tyler Levitan, a spokesperson for Independent Jewish Voices. "It stoops to capitalize on a tragic situation by attacking human rights activists."

Further along, the House of Commons on Feb. 25 unanimously condemned global anti-semitism following the introduction of a motion by Liberal MP Irwin Cotler, who once addressed Israel's major annual policy in Herzliya.

But look past the perfectly reasonable expressions of outright horror at the violence against Jews and their communal institutions and cemeteries, presumably in Europe, it is apparent in implicitly in the hyperbolic language of the Feb. 25 resolution that BDS is the intended target.

"Criticism of Israel is not anti-semitic, and saying so is wrong. But singling Israel out for selective condemnation and opprobrium — let alone denying its right to exist or seeking its destruction — is discriminatory and hateful, and not saying so is dishonest;" the motion states.

In a Canadian political climate of heightened hysteria about terrorism and little sympathy for the Palestinians, should it be surprising that not a single parliamentarian in Ottawa was willing to tackle what this resolution was really all about. (Also forgotten in the Cotler motion is that Palestinian Arabs are also Semites.)

Something prescient was expressed a little over a year ago by Israel-American journalist Larry Derfner that still seems relevant today.

He said the two-state Israel-Palestine solution — now on its deathbed in face of mounting Jewish settlements on the West Bank — may need BDS for an infusion back to life.

He represents a number of liberal Zionists — which Derfner identifies as — who are also despairing of the direction of Israel with the continued occupation and the daily and violent racism directed against Palestinian Arabs.

Up to now, many of these same people have been uncomfortable with the failure of BDS organizers to spell out one way or another on the resolution for the Israel-Palestine conflict — should it be two states versus one.

But that is becoming academic for Derfner:

"Moreover, BDS isn't an all-or-nothing tactic. If liberal Zionists don't want to boycott Israel, let them just boycott the settlements. If they want to support the economic boycott but not the cultural boycott, or the cultural boycott but not the academic boycott, that also helps. But if they don't want to boycott anything, let them come up with a better idea for transforming the status quo, or just any idea that hasn't already failed," he wrote in May 19, 2014.

Since then, it has been apparent that the Netanyahu government is in trouble and could lose the March 17 election to the Zionist Camp, led by the Labor Party. But it is not clear that the latter will differ much from its predecessor in seriously uprooting the Jewish settlers to make way for the much discussed Palestinian state.

At the same time, a surge of support for the Joint List of Arab parties and Hadash (the Jewish-Arab Communist party) will add a new dimension to Israel politics where Palestinians have for decades been marginalized.

BDS has not yet made a significant dent in the Israel economy. But Israel's supporters are sufficiently nervous about its impact that they are trying to put it out of business.

To dub it anti-semitic is particularly abhorrent for those whose parents or offspring experienced the real thing up close in its grossest and genocide-form in Europe.

Finally, there is not direct evidence that BDS activists will receive the same kind of intelligence scrutiny that already affects anti-pipeline protesters and some members of the Muslim community.

However, amidst this toxic atmosphere in Ottawa, it is hard to rule anything out at the moment.

Paul Weinberg is a Hamilton based freelance writer who can be reached at paulweinberg@bell.net.

Photo: flickr/Stephen Harper

Source: http://rabble.ca/news/2015/03/bill-c-51-wants-you-to-stop-protesting-support-palestinians

MARCH 11, 2015

Behind the Climate Negotiating Text for COP21

Pablo Solón — 2015-04-04T13:57:33Z

The future lies in the past. What has happened will determine what will come. The idea that we can change everything and save the world at the last minute is exciting in movies but it does not work in real life. It particularly applies when we speak about issues like climate change where the consequences of what we did in the past century are just beginning to manifest.

This principle applies also to climate negotiations. What is now on the table after the climate negotiations held in Geneva from 8-13 February 2015 is setting the scope and the range of possibilities for the climate agreement at the upcoming COP 21 in Paris this December.

The good news

The good news is that in Geneva the climate negotiations have finally really started. Smoothly and quickly, delegations from different countries avoided long speeches and went directly to work to compile their different proposals for a future climate agreement in Paris. At the moment, the negotiating text has 86 pages and 1,273 brackets. The task for the next 10 months is to streamline this bracketed draft and come out with a text of around 20 pages without annexes and zero brackets.

In the current text there are good and bad proposals that yet need to be negotiated and agreed. The final result will be something in between the most ambitious and the weakest proposals. So how good are the more positive proposals on the table? Are they going to put us on a path that limits the increase of the temperature to 1.5 ºC or 2 ºC?

Disturbing omissions

By now, it is well known that to achieve the goal to limit the temperature increase to below 2ºC, we need to leave 80% of the current known fossil fuel reserves under the ground. This has been stated in many studies, reports and interventions, but not one single country has submitted this proposal in the current text of negotiations. The word “fossil fuels” only appears twice throughout the text and only in reference to the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies. How are we going to cut back greenhouse gas emissions if we don't have an agreement to leave under the soil, the 80% of the “black gold” that has been discovered?

The other disturbing omission is the short-term target for 2025 and 2030. In the text there are 13 references to zero emissions by the mid and end of the century. But when it comes to this decade and the next, there are no concrete targets and just general references about “enhancing the mitigation ambition” that appears 61 times in the text. The targets that are needed are very clear in different studies. The UNEP Emissions Gap report and other studies show that to be consistent with a trajectory that limits the increase of the temperature to 2ºC, global greenhouse gas emissions have to be reduced to 44 Gigatons (Gt) of CO2e by 2020, 40 Gt by 2025 and 35 Gt by 2030. This is the cap the world needs to avoid a future too dire to imagine. Now, in the text there are no references to these figures. There are only proposals in terms of percentages for the next half of the century. The most ambitious for the near term says, “Developed country Parties shall take mitigation commitments for the post-2020 period that are more ambitious than emission reductions of at least 25–40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020”. In other words, the next decade you have to be more ambitious than this decade. That is not really a clear target.

These omissions in the text are not an accident, they reflect an agreement that for the coming years until 2030, every country will do what they can/want and the UNFCCC will just summarize the “intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs)”. No single country has challenged this suicidal path by putting in the negotiating text that we need a global target to reduce global emissions to only 40 Gt of CO2e by 2025 to avoid an increase in the temperature of 4ºC to 8 ºC.

The center of the debate?

Looking at the negotiating text, it is clear that what seems to be the center of the controversy is not about how much to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but around the supposed conflict between developed and developing countries. The word “development” appears 247 times in the negotiating text, “developing” countries 410 and “developed” countries 342 times. The debate in the text is more about who should do what in the reduction of green house gas emissions (developed and developing), what flexibility mechanisms (carbon markets) are going to be in place, how each one is going to report, what kind of verification process will be established for the different type of countries and what kind of financial and technological support there will be to implement the mitigation actions.

The position of developed countries in general tends to water down the difference between developed and developing countries, promoting more the use of “all parties” (134 mentions in the text). On the other hand, developing countries want to keep the firewall between developed and developing countries.

The group of Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) that includes Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria and Venezuela has included the following paragraphs in the negotiating text that show their approach to developed and developing countries:

“Developed country Parties shall commit to undertake Absolute Emission Reduction Targets during the period of 2021-2030, in accordance with a global emission budget including their historical responsibility, through quantifiable, economy-wide mitigation targets, covering all sectors and all greenhouse gases, implemented mainly domestically, which can be aggregated and which are comparable, measurable, reportable and verifiable, with the type, scope, scale and coverage more ambitious than those undertaken under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol during the pre-2020 period, and communicated and implemented without any conditions”.

On the other hand, “Developing country Parties should commit to undertake Diversified Enhanced Mitigation Actions (DEMAs) during the period 2021–2030. They may include, inter alia, relative emission reductions; intensity targets; REDD-plus activities and other plans, programmes and policies; joint mitigation and adaptation approaches; net avoided emissions, or also manifested as adaptation co-benefits, in accordance with their special circumstances and specific needs.”

While it is true that this is a real source of debate – the maintenance of the delineation between developed and developing countries so that developed countries do not escape their historic responsibility, and that countries make commitments according to common but differentiated responsibility, it is also one that serves as a smokescreen for the deals that have been made between polluters – one developed and one developing. China, which has caught up to developed countries on levels of emissions, maintains the developing country title but does the rest of the developing countries a disservice by striking a very bad deal with one of the largest polluters in the world, the United States. The highly publicized US-China deal last year is a reflection of how the US and China, two of the largest polluters, have decided not to do what is needed for 2025/2030. The two big polluters account for more than 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions. This is a “laissez faire” deal in which China will only peak (reduce in absolute terms) emissions in 2030 and the US will reduce 15% of their green house gas emissions in 2025 based on their level of emissions in 1990. As a reference, the EU has committed to reduce 40% of their emissions by 2030 based on their 1990 levels.

This is the heart of the deal in Paris and with these emission cuts from the US and China, the rest of the countries will not do much more because as they have expressed, that would go against their competitiveness in the global economy. The negotiation around the text is about how to package and sell a bad deal to public opinion and how to dilute the responsibility of polluting countries of the developed and the emerging developing world. Probably the issue about “common but differentiated responsibility” will be solved through the addition of some “innovative language” like “in light of different national circumstances” as it happened in COP20 in Peru.

Opening the door for new carbon markets

Even with the failure of carbon markets, the debate is not if this mechanism should continue or not, but how to enhance the current ones and develop new ones. No country has submitted text to avoid carbon market mechanisms or REDD+. Carbon market mechanisms are mentioned 27 times and REDD+ 13 times. In the text there are mentions of an “enhanced Clean Development Mechanism (CDM+)”, the “Emissions Trading System (ETS)”, “REDD Plus”, “market mechanism in the land use sector”, “sub-national and regional emissions schemes” and “carbon pricing”. A reading of the text shows that COP 21 will open the door for new carbon market mechanisms but that the real development of them will be agreed at future COPs.

Finance: the forgotten promise

Finance, which was supposed to be one of the most crucial commitments by the developed countries to the developing countries, has now become an issue relegated to the sidelines. The climate debt owed to those suffering the impacts of climate change, yet who are the least responsible, is on the way to being forgotten. Looking at the text, the word finance itself is mentioned 203 times but when it comes to concrete figures, there are only a measly 14 mentions with only four proposals:

• [Developed countries][All countries in a position to do so] commit to provide at least USD 50 billion per year during the period from 2020 to 2025, at least USD 100 billion per year by [2020][2030] for adaptation activities of [developing countries].
• The provision of finance committed by developed country Parties to be based on a floor of USD 100 billion per year since 2020.
• A short-term collective quantified goal of USD 200 billion per year by 2030 should be committed by developed country Parties,
• [Developed country Parties][Parties in a position to do so, considering evolving capabilities] to provide 1 per cent of gross domestic product per year from 2020 and additional funds during the pre-2020 period to the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

If current promises are to be a basis, there is little confidence in these promised numbers. At the COP20 in Lima, there was triumph around the achievement of reaching 10 billion USD – out of the 100 billion USD that was originally promised several COPs ago.

Furthermore, in the text, developed countries prefer to use the term “mobilize” instead of “provide” and they do not limit the obligation of funding to developed countries but to all countries in a position to do so, further diluting the responsibilities of the developed countries as they spread it to developing countries. The term “mobilize” is not associated with any figure in particular and in general includes “from a variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources” which means that even loans and carbon markets will be accounted in the process of mobilization of financial resources.

Rights and compliance

Human rights are mentioned seven times and mainly in the preamble and objectives section. There are no concrete proposals to guarantee human rights in mitigation, finance, market or technology measures. There is only one mention in adaptation and only in general terms. In some cases, the mention of human rights is at the same level as the right to development. Indigenous peoples' rights appears only two times in the preamble. Migrant rights are not included, and in the loss and damage chapter, there are only two mentions of “organized migration and planned relocation”. The proposal of Rights of Mother Earth or Rights of Nature is not included at all as an option to be discussed. The only mention to Mother Earth is in relation to “protecting the integrity of Mother Earth” without further development.

When it comes to mechanisms of compliance, there are those that say, “no specific provisions required” and those that suggest a “Compliance Committee” with “an enforcement branch and a facilitative branch”. The possibility of sanctions is mentioned and also suggested is the “use of economic instruments such as market mechanisms as a way to promote compliance”. Bolivia has included the proposal for an “International Climate Justice Tribunal”.

These token mentions of rights and recognition of those at the frontlines of climate change are empty promises with no concrete commitments attached to them. The negotiations around solutions to climate change need to have the rights of peoples and Nature at its heart.

Fighting for our Future now, not in Paris

The nature of climate change with its feedback mechanism is such that what we did in the past is what we reap now. Following this logic, what we do now is what we will reap in the next 10 years, and if the current text is to be the basis of that future, we will have none of which to speak.

There is no cheating, buying or creating loopholes to delay action until 2030 – the time to act decisively is now. And these are very concrete and clear actions that need to be taken:

• leave 80 percent of the known fossil fuels reserves under the ground
• deep emissions cuts to achieve global targets - 44 Gigatons (Gt) of CO2e by 2020, 40 Gt by 2025 and 35 Gt by 2030
• reduce military and defense expenditures, which account for more than 1.5 trillion dollars globally, and instead channel these funds to provide public finance for developing countries for adaptation, mitigation and for loss and damage
• the recognition, respect and promotion of the rights of people and nature

A bad deal in Paris will lock in catastrophic consequences for the future of the planet and humanity. The urgency of the task at hand cannot be emphasized enough – we need to act now.

Pablo Solón is Executive Director of Focus on the Global South.

Quebec Police Don't Live in a Bubble

Gabriel Nadeau-Dubois — 2015-04-04T13:54:01Z

When faced with a symbolically criminalized enemy, there's only one possible attitude: all-out war.

Last Thursday, a police officer from the Service de police de la ville de Québec (SPVQ) shot 18-year-old Noémie Trudeau-Tremblay in the face with a tear gas canister at point-blank range. The images of the assault that circulated were qualified as “shocking” and “troubling” by Quebec's Liberal minister of public safety and provoked a wave of indignation across social networks. Beyond the anger that the event produced, one thing is obvious: Quebec has a serious police brutality problem. However, the roots of the issue go deeper than just police training and culture. In order to grasp this phenomenon, one must also question the reigning climate in our public spaces. Whose voices are on the minds of the police officers when they so viciously attack protesters?

The day following the incident, one of the capital city's radio hosts affirmed, “as a taxpayer,” being “very proud of the work of the police officers yesterday.” A few days earlier, a headline in the Journal de Québec touted “The Québec City method,” praising the efficiency of the previous day's police intervention, which saw nearly 250 protesters surrounded and then arrested under a mere municipal by-law. That same day, a host from another radio station in the capital congratulated the police dog that seriously bit a protester: “The police dog deserves a good Gaines-Burger!” he exclaimed on-air.

These questionable statements are the climax of the dangerous rhetorical escalation we have been witnessing since the beginning of the student mobilization a week ago. The airwaves of the capital region carry the message that it is imperative that “the Quebec government request the enforcement of the War Measures Act and that the army take over Quebec.” On the same station a few days prior, it was declared that “the government should pass an anticipatory special law. To warn people that if there are troublemakers, we'll get them right away. We'll shoot on sight if necessary!”

These incendiary statements are just the trash-media version of the broader offensive we're currently witnessing. In his latest column, even journalist Mathieu Bock-Côté, who isn't sympathetic to student strikers, worried whether the intensifying “vicious comments” aimed at them could even be described as a spreading “hatred of students.” A quick glance at social media confirms that it's a real phenomenon: there are calls for violence, even for the murder of students, aplenty. Is it possible that this climate could influence the work of police officers?

Media brutality

In my book Tenir Tête I quoted philosophy professor Christian Nadeau, who speaks of the emergence, in the spring of 2012, of a phenomenon of media brutality directed towards students. Incendiary columns and statements progressively ostracized, cursed, ridiculed and scorned the young demonstrators, stripping them of their rights as citizens and political actors. That phenomenon is being reproduced in front of our eyes today, with renewed speed and redoubled venom.

Now, faced with an enemy who has been symbolically criminalized, only one approach is possible: total war. When a social group is isolated and ostracized in this way it is no surprise that the police feel more empowered to deal with them violently. Police officers don't live in a bubble: they are exposed to the same media messages as the rest of the population. The officers of the SPVQ are no exception. They heard, along with many others, the calls to violence from the hosts of talk radio. What state of mind do you imagine that puts them in, when it comes time to don their armour?

Beyond police culture

Much has been reported in recent years on the recurring problem of racial, social and political profiling by the police forces of Quebec. This phenomenon is explained, correctly, as a result of deficient police training, or of the institutional culture (of racism, sexism, homophobia, negative prejudices towards activists, etc.) dominant in most police forces. Those are, without doubt, real causes of this problem. But I fear that we are forgetting that below the problems of our police culture, lies the more fundamental problem of our public space. If certain categories of the population are targeted for police violence (students, homeless, visible minorities, etc.) it is because the authors of that violence have been given the impression, rightly or wrongly, that the political class or public opinion will forgive them in advance for their excesses, and secretly rejoice to see them.

The excerpts quoted above demonstrate that some commentators and hosts have become little more than agent provocateurs. The only difference being that here it is not the police infiltrating and provoking protesters to throw a few rocks. This time, it is the opinion makers who, by their excesses of language, participate in the radicalization of police violence. When you hear every morning (and who knows what they listen to in the offices of the SPVQ, but we can guess) on the radio that you need to “beat up” this “gang of morons” who protest, this will necessarily be reflected in the work done by police on the ground. This much should be obvious.

In 2012, the consequences were tragic: two students lost their sight in one eye. This time, how bad will it get? I shudder to think.

Source: https://ricochet.media/en/374/quebec-police-dont-live-in-a-bubble

Syriza's Only Choice: A Radical Step Forward

Spyros Lapatsioras, John Milios and Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos — 2015-04-04T13:51:23Z

“One must know how to employ the kairos [right or opportune moment] of one's forces at the right moment. It is easy to only lose a little, if one always keeps foremost in the mind the idea that unity is never the trick, but the game.”

– Guy Gebord, “Notes on poker.”

1. Introduction

The transitional “bridge Agreement” of the 20th of February is a truce intended by the Greek government and welcomed by the other side (the European “institutions”). Within the truce period (the next four months), the conditions for negotiating the next agreement will be shaped. This could mean that everything is still open. However, that is not true for two reasons. First, the very transitional agreement changes the balance of power. Second, the “hostilities” will continue in the course of the next four months (i.e. the review of the commitments and the re-interpretation of the terms by each party).

2. The Agreement of February 20: A First Step on Slippery Ground...

2.1 Negotiation targets

In the first substantive phase of negotiations at the Eurogroup of the 12th February, the Greek government sought an agreement on a new “bridge program” stating that it would be impossible to extend the existing program on the grounds that it has been rejected by the Greek people:

1. The “bridge program” would not involve conditions, reviews and so on, but should be an official manifestation of the willingness of all parties to negotiate without pressure and blackmail and without any unilateral action.

2. In the above context, Greece would forgo the remaining installments of the previous program, with the exception of the return of the €1.9-billion that the ECB and the rest of Eurozone's national central banks gained from the holding of Greek bonds (programs SMP and ANFA). Greek authorities could issue treasury bills beyond the limit of €15-billion to cover any liquidity emergencies.

3. At the end of this transitional period: (a) Greece would submit its final proposals, which according to the program of the government would include a new fiscal framework for the next 3-4 years and a new national plan for reforms; (b) the issue of a sovereign debt restructuring-reduction would come to the negotiating table.

The German government and the “institutions” (EU, ECB, IMF) came to the negotiations with the position that Greece had to request a six-month “technical extension” of the existing program – renamed as the “existing arrangement” – to enable its successful completion.

2.2 The outcome of the negotiation

The agreement of the 20th of February includes a four-month extension of the “Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement (MFFA), which is underpinned by a set of commitments.” The extension of the Agreement (“which is underpinned by a set of commitments”) means: (a) evaluations by the three “institutions,” (b) commitments and conditions, (c) scheduled installments as they appear in the previous Program, subject to a positive evaluation, (d) return of the profits from holding Greek bonds by the ECB and national CBs, but subject to a positive evaluation by the “institutions” (even given the “independence” of the ECB).

In short there is a rejection-withdrawal of the Greek government's negotiation targets (1) and (2). In addition, there is no explicit reference to how the government will cover its short term financing needs (e.g. issuing treasury bills to cover bond redemptions, interest payments and other possible emergencies) until the completion of the assessment. In this regard, the reference to the independence of the ECB may imply its “discretion” in assessing the extent to which the Greek government responds positively to the “commitments” that accompany the extension of the agreement (something which undoubtedly will complicate any “interpretative” attempts in relation to the agreement on the part of Greek government).

At the same time, the February 20 Agreement includes the statement: “The Greek authorities have also committed to ensure the appropriate primary fiscal surpluses or financing proceeds required to guarantee debt sustainability in line with the November 2012 Eurogroup statement.” This means that the Greek government refrains from the target of debt restructuring-reduction and adopts the sustainability plan based on debt repayment mostly through primary surpluses. This implies the rollback from point (3b) of its initial negotiating package.

What the Greek government has won (aside from the mere change in terminology, about which there was intense debate) is:

A. Part (a) of section (3) of its initial suggestions, namely the right to propose reforms to the “institutions” for approval with regard to fiscal consolidation and growth. The policy measures agreed by the previous government (reduction of pensions and increase of VAT in the islands) were thus taken out. Both sides agreed to give particular emphasis to the “overdue” fight against corruption and tax evasion, public sector efficiency, improving the tax system, etc.[1]

B. Further negotiations on the size of the primary surplus for 2015. Instead of the previously agreed 3% of GDP, the new agreement leaves open the issue of a lower primary surplus for 2015: “The institutions will, for the 2015 primary surplus target, take the economic circumstances in 2015 into account.”

It is clear that the new agreement is a truce, but truce is by no means a tie. The agreement is a first step on slippery ground. The Greek government may have gained time, but the political landscape seems quite tough, having minor similarities with the initial minimumnegotiation targets set by the Greek side on February 12th.

3. Is There Still Room to Challenge Neoliberalism?

3.1 The supervision as balance between “political risk” and “moral hazard”

The political strategy of Syriza and the European Left is to overthrow neoliberalism, that is the economic and social regime that seeks to subordinate all social practices (from education and social security to the public finances) to the jurisdiction and regulatory role of markets. The European Left thus seeks to leave to governments the freedom to curtail the power of markets, thereby bringing to the fore the priority of social needs.

Neoliberalism constantly promotes the interests of capital against the interests of the workers, professionals, pensioners, young people and other vulnerable groups. The extreme version of neoliberalism, as expressed, for example, by [German Finance Minister Wolfgang] Schäuble, is not devoid of rational objectives and strategy. It attempts to resolve, and so far it does, two fundamental issues:

First, the social legitimacy of a model of labour without rights and social protection, with low and flexible wages and the absence of any meaningful bargaining power. Such a development is to be pursued in order to create favorable conditions for profitability and capital accumulation.

Second, the organization of the Eurozone (the coordination of fiscal policies, banking union, rescue packages, etc.) on the basis that member states should not succumb to “moral hazard” with the support of social (and other) expenditures that rely on public borrowing. Member States are faced with the dilemma: austerity-cuts-privatizations or the risk of default. By and large, these are commensurate choices. Even in the latter scenario, member states would accept a rescue package, the content of which is again austerity-cuts-privatizations.

This conservative perspective favors debt repayment by way of privatizations and primary surpluses, while it is not opposed to reforms such as those proposed by the Greek government (and possibly needed by Greek society) – such as more efficient organization of tax collections, modernization of the public administration,[2] and the fight against corruption. They may even welcome a new political personnel, as they realize that the traditional political staff is in decline, having lost its social legitimacy. A political scene dominated by the traditional political personnel, which has been discredited in the eyes of the social majority, is clearly considered by the neoliberal establishment as a “political risk” since it can easily trigger uncontrolled social outbreaks.

At the same time, neoliberalism recognizes as “moral hazard” any policy that supports the interests of the working-class, expands the public space, supports the welfare state, and organizes the reproduction of society beyond and outside the scope of markets.

In other words, the strategic question for neoliberalism is to define the level of austerity that targets an “optimal” balance between “political risk” and “moral hazard.”

Generally speaking, these two risks, the “moral” and the “political” one, move in opposite directions due to their consequences in the current political conjuncture. When moral hazard increases, political risk declines and vice versa. Therefore, the tension (when they encounter each other) results in an appropriate balance between them. The “independent authorities,” being immunized against any democratic control, especially on issues related to the economy (the main example here is the “independence” of the ECB), create a mechanism for detecting the balance between these two “risks.” Nevertheless, this mechanism remains incomplete.

In the European Union the key role to austerity has now been undertaken by the “evaluation of the agreements.” If we closely inspect the agreement of the 20th of February, we will see that it is not entirely closed to demands that increase “moral hazard,” i.e. to promoting arrangements to the benefit of the welfare state and labour interests. However, the key point of the agreement is that “institutions” will assess, supervise and indicate which particular reforms do not create problems to public finances and do not jeopardize future economic growth and the stability and smooth functioning of the financial system.[3] This assessment-surveillance sets a serious impediment to the implementation of the political program and the social transformations sought by Syriza in the first place.

While the question of how the government will be able to meet its financing needs remains open, statements by the ECB and the IMF are eloquent proofs of the continuous assessment stemming from the nature of the agreement: new pledged reforms are interpreted as substitutes for the commitments of the previous agreement. In particular the IMF does not accept any rollback from the completion of reforms mentioned in the previous “Program” with regard to market flexibility, privatizations, and social security reforms. It is worth noting that the non-quantification of objectives, the non-specified deficit, the absence of any explicit estimation of the fiscal gap, leaves widely open the interpretation of the actions with regard to the new agreement as equivalent to those contained in the previous one.[4]

3.2 How did we get there: On the tactics and strategy of the negotiation

The main question about the importance of the agreement of the 20th of February is what room it leaves to the government to implement its program. To answer this question we need first to analyze the “difficulties” that led the government to the compromise of the 20th of February.

The agreement was apparently determined by external factors – the given and known neoliberal context of the “institutions” – and internal factors, which played finally the most important role.

It was only of secondary importance the weak preparation of the government, along with the contradictory tactics of the Ministry of Finance:

* The absence of any reliable plan based on numbers and analysis. The superficial level is obvious in the technical Annex of the “non-paper” prepared by the Greek government for the Eurogroup meeting of February 16. More importantly, in the same Annex the crucial assumption is made that debt sustainability can be associated with long-term primary surpluses. This argument is an important strategic retreat.

* The release of some general principles of the proposal for debt reduction from London. This was a tactical mistake: Without any prior meeting with the ECB, a proposal is announced from a non Eurozone country that involves a swap of bonds held by the ECB. This proposal requires a change in the ECB rules and invokes, without any second thought, a negative response by the ECB. The negative response by the ECB is related not only to its policy and the existing delicate balance on the board, but also to the criticisms it received for rules violation after the recent decision to embark on quantitative easing. It is also obvious that the ECB does not need to be directly involved in such an agreement. The same result could be reached by alternative ways that are not incompatible with current political balances. The other part of the proposal concerning the loans of the EFSF linked to growth rates is too abstract and vague and definitely concerns the next round of the negotiations.

* It seemed that the government gave too much emphasis to communications management of the negotiation as opposed to other important aspects of it. This was a negative signal, both domestically and abroad. For instance, theincident with [Eurozone finance chief Jeroen] Dijsselbloem apparently stimulated “national sentiment,” but also took away considerable bargaining power: the Greek government spent the whole weekend calming down the markets before Monday's critical opening. This fact widely signaled that the Greek government might not not have any stable negotiation strategy.

We can easily see that this weakly planned negotiation by the Greek side, despite the time spent by the protagonists, was practically a blind jump. Several mishandlings and shifts showed the partners that the Greek side is susceptible to manipulation.

Nevertheless, what finally determined the outcome of the negotiation was neither the tactical moves nor the “external” front, but the front within the Greek society. What determined the retreat of the Greek side was the strategic decision to represent on the political level the social strata which perceive as unthinkable any disruption of market stability – even though everyone was aware of the actual historical stake of the confrontation. The much discussed scenario of a bank-run should be defined and examined (despite the technical mechanisms available to prevent it) always within the context of the social relations of power. At the same time, it is a fatal mistake to adopt the argument that a Grexit necessarily follows from a supposed “collapse” of banks. This is a zero-probability scenario, which simply was the argument used by the previous conservative Papandreou-Papademos-Samaras governments to present memoranda as the only choice to the Greek society. This argument always remains a “weapon” of extreme neoliberals like Schäuble.[5]

3.3 The challenge: Nothing can change or another world is possible?

The above analysis leads us to the conclusion that we have an agreement which significantly restricts freedom of action on public finances but also in other areas. Therefore, the economic landscape, which sets the ground not only for the final assessment of the new program in June but also for the new round of negotiations, is slippery.

The fact that the Greek government chooses to present the apparent retreat and forced change of its program as a “victory” is a bad sign for the future. It shows that the government is more interested in communication than in substance. This attitude could gradually become the political ground for a real defeat, especially as long as the message transmitted and received by the society reinforces the belief: “Do not believe the politicians in what they say, their only intention is to stay in the government.”

“The question ... is whether the government will insist on superficially presenting the result of the negotiation as a ‘victory,' disregarding all the critical issues that emerged, or will it attempt to analyze in depth the conditions and the consequences of the retreat?”

Let us consider the following simple fact: The Minister of Finance publicly accepted that 70% of the existing Memorandum is good for the Greek society. Nevertheless, this government did not come to power supporting the 70% of the Memorandum – if Syriza had pledged so, it would probably not be included in the parliamentary map today, playing the key role. The attempt to redefine the mandate so as to encompass the 70% of the Memorandum is practically an attempt to change the social alliances which has supported so far the historical experiment of a left government. Obviously 70% in itself is just an arbitrary number (why not 68% or 72%?; is it based on pages, sub-chapters, or measures?). Its adoption invokes a new political symbolism and paves the way for new social alliances. The question, which remains open even for the government, is whether the government will insist on superficially presenting the result of the negotiation as a “victory,” disregarding all the critical issues that emerged, or will it attempt to analyze in depth the conditions and the consequences of the retreat as long as there is still time (very little, indeed, since the next round of negotiations will soon start)?

In fact the agreement of February 20th leaves the government and Syriza with only one way out of the impasse of neoliberal European corset: storming forward!

* Storming forward with truth as vehicle: to start from the assumption of a retreat in order to seek out ways to avoid any long term damage. The government should instead bring back on the agenda our programmatic commitments to redistribute income and power in favor of labour, to re-found the welfare state, democracy and participation in decision making.

* Storming forward with the vehicle of radical reform of the tax system (so that capital and the wealthy strata of the society finally bear their appropriate burden) and the fight against corruption of part of the Greek economic elites.

A new wave of radical domestic institutional changes is urgently needed in order to build on a new basis the social alliances with the subordinate classes. Metaphorically, what is missing and seems to disappear after the agreement of the 20th of February is any domestic “memorandum against the wealth” which will improve the living conditions of the working people. The goal that “capital should pay for the crisis” has never been more to the point.

In a society where the loss of 25% of GDP and the impoverishment of large part of the population is just the visible aspect of the rapid intensification of social inequalities, in a society where mass unemployment is the numerical complement of a severe deterioration in working conditions, in a society of multiple contradictions and high expectations, the popularity of the government will not be maintained at 80 per cent for a long time.

The policy of the government can only remain hegemonic if it supports the interests of the working majority in a struggle against neoliberal strategy. There is no room for “ethnarch” policy generally and loosely defending everything “Greek” or “European”: such an approach never has, and never will represent the perspective of the Left. •

Spyros Lapatsioras is Assistant Professor of Political Economy, University of Crete, Member of the Central Committee of Syriza.

John Milios is Professor of Political Economy, National Technical University of Athens, Member of the Central Committee of Syriza.

Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos is Senior Lecturer at the Open University Business School in the UK and member of Syriza.

Endnotes:

1. Of course, every decision still requires approval by the “institutions”: “The Greek authorities commit to refrain from any rollback of measures and unilateral changes to the policies and structural reforms that would negatively impact fiscal targets, economic recovery or financial stability, as assessed by the institutions.” [“Eurogroup statement on Greece” Feb. 20, 2015.]

2. The devil always hides in the details, in the form that this modernization will take.

3. For instance, we should not forget that economic growth in the current program relies on exports and that every wage increase is automatically considered as being against competitiveness and the target increase in exports. No matter how empirically erroneous is this perspective, it still reflects the viewpoint of the “institutions.” Another example is the solution to the non-performing loans because it affects the financial systems and thus every policy proposal should secure the OK by the “institutions.”

4. In his official letter to Jeroen Dijsselbloem on Feb. 24, 2015, Mario Draghi says: “We note that the commitments outlined by the authorities differ from existing programme commitments in a number of areas. In such cases, we will have to assess during the review whether measures which are not accepted by the authorities are replaced with measures of equal or better quality in terms of achieving the objectives of the programme.”

5. James Galbraith also refers to “grexit” as an adequate reason to seek an immediate compromise: “No agreement would have meant capital controls, or else bank failures, debt default, and early exit from the Euro.” [“Reading The Greek Deal Correctly” Feb. 23, 2015.]

Source: http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1089.php#continue

Free Speech, Fearless Listening and Fair Trial

Sukumar Muralidharan — 2015-04-04T13:48:03Z

How India's Daughter has led to a bonfire of free speech

Free speech is not about raging at the walls of an empty room. It also involves the right to be heard. And this freedom could reasonably be limited where speech offends a person of robust common sense. Free speech requires fearless listening.

Yet thresholds of tolerance are notoriously low in a world where offence is a political resource no actor is willing to surrender. Early this month, India's parliament came close to declaring the whole country a cloistered hermitage where no evil will be seen, heard or spoken.

That occasion arose with the scheduled telecast of a documentary on the gang-rape and evisceration of a young woman in Delhi in December 2012. The young woman died within a fortnight of the horror that was inflicted on her, but not before exciting a nation's outrage, causing agonised questioning and getting even the most hardened sceptic to pray – against all human and medical possibility – for her recovery.

Pronouncing himself deeply pained by the contents of the film, Home Minister Rajnath Singh declared in Parliament, soon after the question was posed, that all necessary instructions to ban the documentary's broadcast in India and elsewhere had been issued.

It was another matter that the putative ban perhaps only created a still larger audience for the film on video-sharing websites.

Promos for India's Daughter, produced and directed by British filmmaker Leslee Udwin, began appearing on social media sites of news broadcaster NDTV 24x7 on March 1. These spoke of an interview with one of the accused, Mukesh Singh, since convicted and sentenced to death, which testified to his moral certitude and complete lack of remorse.

A competing channel was not about to let the opportunity go. Times Now which has long since reduced itself to a caricature of serious news analysis and debate, went quickly on air with elaborately simulated indignation. With Arnab Goswami, an anchor-person who has set himself up as the nation's tribune, holding forth with contemptuous aggression towards dissent and unctuous deference to authority, the stage was set for a bonfire of free speech.

Issues of aesthetics and factual veracity – and there are several that could be raised about the film – were quickly buried as agitated minds turned their attention obsessively to Mukesh Singh's unrepentant attitude. Lawyers who represented a seemingly lost cause emerged as loutish and ill-informed, mirroring all the perversities of the criminals they were appointed to defend.

A group of feminists and civil liberties activists, all highly respected for their moral courage and conviction, denounced the locutions of the rape convict as “hate speech” which threatened public order. Others fumed that a convict had been afforded a bully pulpit.

Members of the ruling party fretted over the defamation of the nation. And still others worried about a possible decline in tourist arrivals.

What is the status in law here? In 1994, M.S. Sathyu, the famed director of the partition family drama Garam Hawa, sought permission to interview Dhananjay Chatterjee, a convict awaiting execution for the rape and murder of a child. Denied permission by prison authorities, Sathyu approached the Supreme Court and won the right to conduct an interview on camera, conditional on the subject's informed consent.

In the words of the court then: “The media has the right to every criminal. Likewise, every criminal has the right to every media”.

There was a caveat attached: the interview could not be broadcast or disseminated in any way till the prisoner's appeal was finally heard and the inevitable mercy petition disposed of.

Chatterjee's mercy petition was rejected in 2004 and he was executed soon afterwards. Yet Sathyu's film, an hour-long voyage into the moral repugnance of capital punishment, did not secure a screening till 2012.

The formal language of the Indian Constitution allows for restrictions on free speech to safeguard against contempt of court. The court's ruling in the Dhananjay Chatterjee matter seemingly added the administration of justice as another criterion under which speech could be restrained.

In July 2013, the National Law University (NLU) in Delhi began an ambitious project to gather and analyse all available information on capital punishment. Every execution since Chatterjee's, which broke a long but undeclared moratorium, has triggered public debate, since there is a strong current of opinion for abolition. There is little information in the public domain though, on the numbers on death row and the circumstances in which they were convicted.

Aside from pens and paper, every other recording device was prohibited in each of the prison interviews the NLU carried out, reveals project director and legal scholar, Anup Surendranath. And as part of their ethical guidance, investigators made it a point to fully brief interviewees about the purpose of the project and the manner information would be used.

On the project website (www.deathpenaltyindia.com), the identities of all prisoners are protected so that the judicial process is not affected in any way, going forward.

No such norms were followed in the case of India's Daughter. Prison authorities only reserved to themselves the right to finally approve of the manner in which recordings were used. When faced with a copious volume of footage, their judgment and nerve seemed to fail. Rather than deal with interminable delay, the filmmaker then made a unilateral decision.

In the bargain, ethical questions on the administration of justice were thrown overboard.

Speaking in parliament just after the Home Minister, independent member Anu Agha warned that self-delusion was not a prudent course for a nation struggling to deal with the pathologies of patriarchy. And Javed Akhtar spoke of the salutary public service the documentary had rendered by bringing every man in intimate contact with the potential rapist in him.

These were powerful interventions that yet proved cries in the wilderness, since the mood of the moment was to evade the tough questions. Without an early judicial ruling which upholds the spirit of the Sathyu decision, free speech risks being severely set back by this incident.

And as a postscript, it may be added that the Delhi High Court, which was approached by NDTV 24x7 for a reversal of the ban on India's Daughter, seems from the remarks made by judges hearing the case, to uphold the wisdom of restraint on free speech in the interests of the administration of justice.

March 13 2015

Antisystemic Movements and the Future of Capitalism

Immanuel Wallerstein — 2015-04-04T13:45:08Z

Unrevised version of talk at 39th Annual Meeting of the Political Economy of the World-System Conference, Berlin, Mar. 2015.

The antisystemic movements now find themselves in the midst of a fierce struggle about the future. Let me start by reviewing very briefly my premises, about which I have written much. I do this in order to analyze the role and dilemmas of the antisystemic movements in this struggle, what I now call the Global Left. The modern world-system is a capitalist world-economy functioning within the framework of an interstate system. This system has been in existence for some 500 years. It has been a remarkably successful system in terms of its objective which is the endless accumulation of capital.

However, like all systems from the very largest (the universe) to the smallest nano-systems, this system is a historical system, and as such has three phases - its initial coming into being, its long period of what I call ifs "normal" functioning according to the rules that govern the system, and its inevitable structural crisis. I contend that the world-system is now in this third phase, that of structural crisis.

There are several things to note about how the system operated in its previous “normal” period. It had discernible cyclical rhythms, of which the two most important were the so-called Kondratieff long waves and the hegemonic cycles. Each of these rhythms was imperfectly cyclical in the sense that they followed a consistent pattern of two steps forward followed by one step back. That is, after its upturn phase of the cycle, none of the cyclical rhythms returned all the way to where they had been at the beginning of the upturn, but only to a point somewhat higher. The downturn took the form more of a stagnation than of a true downturn.

To achieve its objectives, each of the two principal rhythms depended on constructing a quasi-monopoly, which brought great benefits to certain groups. However, the quasi-monopolies were necessarily limited in time because they were always self-liquidating.

The modern world-system came into its structural crisis for two reasons. The first is that the three basic costs of capitalist production - personnel, inputs, and infrastructure - rose slowly but steadily over time because of the ways in which producers sought to minimize each of these costs. Their efforts were therefore only partially realizable. Similarly, the mode of enforcing hegemonic supremacies also reached structural limits given the absences of new zones to incorporate into the now global world-system.

The costs of capitalist production had been rising steadily as a percentage of the possible price that could be obtained (effective demand). The consequence of the mode of operations of these two imperfect cyclical rhythms was an upward secular trend over 500 years, moving towards an asymptote. They eventually reached a point where the costs were so high and effective demand so constrained that it was no longer possible to accumulate capital, creating a problem for capitalists themselves. The system had moved so far from a possible equilibrium that they brought about, in conjunction with the limits of hegemonic power, the structural crisis of the system.

A structural crisis is not a cyclical downturn, with which it is regularly confused because of our looseness in using the word "crisis." It is far more than that. It is the point at which the system can no longer be brought back to equilibrium and begins to fluctuate wildly. This can only occur once in the life of a historical system. At the point when the structural crisis begins, the system bifurcates. For natural scientists, a bifurcation means that there are two different solutions to the same equation, something supposedly not normally possible. In ordinary language, we can say that there has come into being two possible and quite different outcomes, two paths along which the system can evolve.

In a bifurcation, one is absolutely certain that the system cannot survive. However, one is equally certain that it is intrinsically impossible to know which fork of the bifurcation will ultimately prevail and thereby result in the creation of a new historical system (or systems).

The origins and evolution of the Global Left can best be appreciated if one understands some major turning-points of the modern world-system. I start with the French Revolution. Most historians consider that the French Revolution brought about a fundamental transformation of France in either its political or economic structures, or both.

I think it did neither of these things. Politically, France had long been following an uneven trajectory of strengthening the central state. As Tocqueville showed a long time ago, the result of the French Revolution was to put this trajectory back on track. Economically, it did not transform France into a capitalist state, since France had been part of the capitalist world-economy for two to three centuries already. As for its supposed abolition of the remnants of feudal law, Marc Bloch showed that the presumed feudal remnants were still there as late as the early twentieth century.

Rather, in my view the significance of the French Revolution lay in the cultural transformation of the modern world-system as a whole. The French Revolution bequeathed to the world-system the tacit worldwide acceptance of two cultural concepts: the normality of change and the sovereignty of the people. The combination of the two had very radical implications. The sovereign people could change the system more or less as they wished. For the dominant classes, this belief severely threatened their interests. The immediate problem was how to handle this new reality. There were three different ways, resulting in the three fundamental ideologies of the post-1789 world - rightwing conservatism, centrist liberalism, and leftwing radicalism. Each of these ideologies was a different way of responding politically to these new beliefs. I call this array of responses the newly-constructed geoculture of the modern world-system.

I interpret the world-revolution of 1848 as a critical confrontation of the three post-1789 ideologies, in which both rightwing Conservatism and leftist Radicalism were outmaneuvered by centrist Liberalism, which was able to assert supremacy over the two rival ideologies.

The Global Left took a crucial turn in the wake of the severe repressions it suffered following the world-revolution of 1848. The key political shift was from relying either on spontaneous rebellions or on utopian withdrawal (the two principal tactics prior to 1848) to the creation of organizational and therefore bureaucratic structures to prepare the base for the long struggle. Such structures began to take shape only in the 1870s.

This dominance of centrist liberalism essentially lasted until the world-revolution of 1968, whose major consequence was precisely to liberate both the conservatives and the radicals from their subordinate status to centrist liberalism. After 1968, they were able to become once again autonomous ideologies, recreating the original triad. Centrist liberalism did not disappear but was reduced to being once again simply one of three competing ideologies.

Organizationally what I call the original version of the antisystemic movements, sometimes called the Old Left, began to be constructed in the last third of the nineteenth century. These movements took two main forms: that of social movements, which considered that the basic struggle was a capitalist struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; and that of the national movements, which considered that the basic struggle was between oppressed peoples and their oppressors.

There were parallel debates about strategy that occurred both in the social and in the nationalist movements. One was whether the movements should seek state power. There were those who said that the state was their principal enemy and that therefore they should combat it permanently and unremittingly. The state could not be reformed. And there were others who insisted that precisely because the state was their enemy, they needed to disarm it by taking it over. In social movements, this was the difference between the Anarchists and the Marxists. In national movements this was the difference between the cultural and political nationalists.

The second great debate was over the relation between what each considered to be the primary historical actor (the proletariat for the social movements, the oppressed people for the national movements) and all other movements. There were those who insisted that the victory of the primary actor had to take precedence over the realization of any other demand. Feminist movements, movements of social minorities, peace movements, environmentalist movements all were told to subordinate their actions and demands to those of the primary actor. Otherwise, it was argued they were acting objectively counter-revolutionary. We call this view verticalism. And there were those who insisted that the demands of other groups for their rights could not wait on the victorious "revolution" of the self-styled primary movements. We call this horizontalism.

In the case of both the social and the national movements, the statist, verticalist strategy won out in a formula we came to call the two-step strategy - first obtain state power, then transform the world. This strategy failed in 1968 precisely because it had succeeded in the preceding twenty-five years. The revolutionaries of 1968 (what the French called the soixante-huitards) were responding to what they saw as several realities. The first was the pervasive imperialist role of the hegemonic power, and what the revolutionaries defined as the collusion thereto of the Soviet Union (the Yalta tacit deal). The second was the failure of the movements, having realized step one of the two-step strategy, to implement the second step and change the world in any significant way. The third was the limitations and misdeeds of a verticalist strategy from the perspective of other movements.

The world-revolution of 1968 came within a particular historical context, that of the acme of the operation of the modern world-system. This was the period running more or less from 1945 to 1970. This period saw the highest historical level of accumulation as well as the most extensive and powerful degree of hegemonic control of the system that had ever been known. It was precisely the fact that the modern world-system worked so well in this period in terms of its objectives that pushed the system too close to the asymptotes and brought on the structural crisis of the world-system.

Initially after 1968, it was the Global Right that was able to take most advantage of the post-1968 situation. These took the form of the so-called Washington Consensus that imposed on virtually all governments a series of measures that undid the so-called developmentalist thrusts of an earlier period. It would not be until 1994 that the Global Left could resume its initiatives. There three successive moments of this reawakening of the Global Left: the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas in 1994; the ability of the demonstrators at the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999 to scuttle the proposed new world treaty guaranteeing so-called intellectual property rights; and the founding of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2001.

What then are the useful and possible strategies of the Global Left during the remaining 20-40 years of the structural crisis of our present system? To do that, I need to remind you of the reasons why the classic two-step strategy failed.

The very belief in the inevitability of progress was substantively depoliticizing, and particularly depoliticizing once an antisystemic movement came to state power. After 1968, the Global Left espoused a sort of anti-statism. This popular shift to anti-statism, hailed though it was by the celebrants of the capitalist system, did not really serve the interests of the latter. For in actuality anti-statism served to delegitimize all state structures, even if it was thought to apply merely to certain particular regimes. It thus undermined (rather than reinforced) the political stability of the world-system, and thereby has been making more acute its systemic crisis.

The politics of the transition are different from the politics of the period of normal operation of the world-system. It is the politics of grabbing advantage and position at a moment in time when politically anything is possible and when most actors find it extremely difficult to formulate middle-range strategies. Ideological and analytic confusion becomes a structural reality rather than an accidental variable. The economics of everyday life is subject to wilder swings than those to which the world had been accustomed and for which there had been easy explanations. Above all, the social fabric seems less reliable and the institutions on which we rely to guarantee our immediate security seem to be faltering seriously. Thus, antisocial crime as well as so-called terrorism seems to be widespread and this perception creates high level of fear. One widespread reflex to increased fear is the expansion of privatized security measures staffed by non-state hired forces.

The Global Right are a complex mix and do not constitute a single organized caucus. The majority of those who identify with them will share in the general confusion and will resort to their traditional short-run politics, perhaps with a higher dose of repressiveness insofar as the politics of concessions will not be seen as achieving the short-run calm it is supposed to produce.

But there is also the small minority among the upper strata who are sufficiently insightful and intelligent to perceive the fact that the present system is collapsing and who wish to ensure that any new system be one that preserves their privileged position. They probably can be divided into two main groups advocating two possible alternative strategies. One is fierce repression and one is the de Lampedusa strategy - to change everything in order that nothing change. Both sub-groups have firm resolve and a great deal of resources at their command. They can hire intelligence and skill, more or less as they wish. They have in fact already been doing so.

I do not know what the de Lampedusa faction will come up with, or by what means they will seek to implement the form of transition they will favor. I do know that, whatever it is, it will seem attractive and be deceptive and is far more dangerous to the Global Left that the advocates of repression. The most deceptive aspect is that such proposals will be clothed as radical, progressive change. It will require constantly applied analytic criticism to bring to the surface what the real consequences would be, and to distinguish and weigh the positive and negative elements of the measures they propose.

The Global Left who wish to move in the direction of a relatively democratic, relatively egalitarian system necessarily act within the framework of an uncertain outcome. This is not easy. There is no bandwagon to climb aboard. There is only a harsh struggle.

Pre-1968 left analysis involved multiple biases that had pushed it the Global Left towards a state-orientation. The first bias was that homogeneity was somehow better than heterogeneity, and that therefore centralization was somehow better than decentralization. This bias derived from the false assumption that equality means identity. To be sure, many thinkers had pointed out the fallacy of this equation, including Marx, who distinguished equity from equality. But for revolutionaries in a hurry, even those who claimed to be Marxist, the centralizing, homogenizing path seemed easiest and fastest. It required no difficult calculation of how to balance complex sets of choices. They were arguing in effect that one cannot add apples and oranges. The only problem is that the real world is precisely made up of apples and oranges. If you can't do such fuzzy arithmetic, you can't make real political choices.

The second bias was virtually the opposite. Whereas the preference for unification of effort and result should have pushed logically towards the creation of a single world movement and the advocacy of a world state, the de facto reality of a multi-state system, in which some states were visibly more powerful and privileged than other states, pushed the movements towards seeing the state in which they lived as a mechanism of defense of collective interests within the world-system, an instrument more relevant for the large majority within each state than for the privileged few. Once again, many thinkers had pointed to the fallacy of believing that any state within the modern world-system would or could serve collective interests rather than those of the privileged few, but weak majorities in weak states could see no other weapon at hand in their struggles against marginalization and oppression than a state structure they thought (or rather they hoped) they might be able to control themselves.

The third bias was the most curious of all. The French Revolution had proclaimed as its slogan the trinity: "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." What has in practice happened ever since is that most people have tacitly dropped the "fraternity" part of the slogan on the grounds that it was mere sentimentality. And the liberal center has insisted that "liberty" had to take priority over "equality." In fact, what the liberals really meant is that "liberty" (defined in purely political terms as a multi-party parliamentary system) was the only thing that mattered and that "equality" represented a danger for "liberty" and had to be downplayed or dropped altogether.

There was flimflam in this analysis, and the Global Left fell for it, in particular its Leninist variant, which responded to this centrist liberal discourse by inverting it, and insisting that (economic) equality had to take precedence over (political) liberty. This was entirely the wrong answer. The correct answer is that there is no way whatsoever to separate liberty from equality. No one can be "free" to choose politically, if one's choices are constrained by an unequal position. And no one can be "equal" economically if one does not have the degree of political freedom that others have, that is, does not enjoy the same political rights and the same degree of participation in real decisions.

Still this is all water under the bridge. The errors of the left, the failed strategy, were an almost inevitable outcome of the operations of the capitalist system against which the Global Left was struggling. And the widespread recognition of this historic failure of the Global Left is part and parcel of the disarray caused by the general crisis of the capitalist world-system.

What is it however that the Global Left should push? I think there are three major lines of theory and praxis to emphasize. The first is what I call "forcing liberals to be liberals." The Achilles heel of centrist liberals is that they don't want to implement their own rhetoric. One centerpiece of their rhetoric is individual choice. Yet at many elementary levels, liberals oppose individual choice. One of the most obvious and the most important is the right to choose where to live. Immigration controls are anti-liberal. Making choices - say choice of doctor or school dependent on wealth is anti-liberal. Patents are anti-liberal. One could go on. The fact is that the capitalist world-economy has survived on the basis of the non-fulfillment of liberal rhetoric. The Global Left should be systematically, regularly, and continuously calling the bluff of centrist liberals.

But of course, calling the rhetorical bluff is only the beginning of reconstruction. We need to have a positive program of our own. There has been a veritable sea-change in the programs of left parties and movements around the world between as late as the 1960s and today. In the 1960s, the programs of Old Left movements emphasized economic structures. They advocated one form or another, one degree or another, of the socialization, usually the nationalization, of the means of production. They said little, if anything, about inequalities that were not defined as class-based. Today, almost all of these same parties and movements, or their successors, put forward proposals to deal with inequalities of gender, race, and ethnicity. Many of these programs are terribly inadequate, but at least the movements feel it necessary to say something. On the other hand, there is virtually no party or movement today that considers itself on the left that advocates further socialization or nationalization of the means of production, and a goodly number that are actually proposing moving in the other direction. It is a breathtaking turnabout. Some hail it, some denounce it. Most just accept it.

In the period since 1968, there has been an enormous amount of testing of alternative strategies by different movements, old and new, and there has been in addition a rather healthy shift in the relations of antisystemic movements to each other in the sense that the murderous mutual denunciations and vicious struggles of yesteryear have considerably abated, a positive development we have been underestimating. I would like to suggest some lines along which we could develop further the idea of an alternative strategy.

(1) Expand the spirit of Porto Alegre. What is this spirit? I would define it as follows. It is the coming together in a non-hierarchical fashion of the world family of antisystemic movements to push for (a) intellectual clarity, (b) militant actions based on popular mobilization that can be seen as immediately useful in people's lives, (c) simultaneously argue for longer run, more fundamental changes.

There are three crucial elements to the spirit of Porto Alegre. It is a loose structure that has brought together on a world scale movements from the South and the North, and on more than a merely token basis. It is militant, both intellectually and politically. Intellectually, it is not in search of a global consensus with the spirit of Davos. And politically, it is militant in the sense that the movements of 1968 were militant. Of course, we shall have to see whether a loosely structured world movement can hold together in any meaningful sense, and by what means it can develop the tactics of the struggle. But its very looseness makes it a force difficult to suppress, while encouraging centrist forces to be neutral, if hesitantly.

(2) Use defensive electoral tactics. If the Global Left commits itself to loosely structured, extra-parliamentary militant tactics, this immediately raises the question of our attitude towards electoral processes. Scylla and Charybdis are thinking that they're crucial and thinking that they're irrelevant. Electoral victories will not transform the world; but they cannot be neglected. They are an essential mechanism of protecting the immediate needs of the world's populations against losses of achieved benefits. The electoral battles must be fought in order to minimize the damage that can be inflicted by the Global Right via control of the world's governments.

We cannot neglect such battles because all of us live and survive in the present and no movement can tell people that short-term survival is unimportant. This makes, however, electoral tactics a purely pragmatic matter. Once we don't think of obtaining state power as a mode of transforming the world, they are always a matter of opting for the lesser evil, and the decision of what is the lesser evil has to be made case by case and moment by moment.

The choice depends in part on what is the electoral system. A system with winner-takes-all must be manipulated differently than a system with two rounds or a system with proportional representation. In addition, there are many different party and sub-party traditions amongst the Global Left. Most of these traditions are relics of another era, but many people still vote according to them.

Since state elections are a pragmatic matter, it is crucial to create alliances that respect these traditions, aiming for the 51% that counts pragmatically. But no dancing in the streets, when we win! Electoral victory is merely a defensive tactic.

(3) Push democratization unceasingly. For at least two centuries, what left movements and ordinary people have most loudly demanded of the states can be resumed in one word “more” , more education, more health, more guaranteed lifetime income. This is not only popular; it is immediately useful in people's lives. And it tightens the squeeze on the possibilities of the endless accumulation of capital. These demands should be pushed continuously, and everywhere. There cannot be too much.

To be sure, expanding all these "welfare state" functions always raises questions of efficiency of expenditures, of corruption, of creating over-powerful and unresponsive bureaucracies. These are all questions we should be ready to address, but they should never lessen the basic demand of more, much more.

It is crucial that popular movements not spare the center or left-of-center governments they have elected from the pursuit of these demands. Just because it is a friendlier government than an outright right government does not mean that we should pull our punches. Pressing friendly governments pushes rightwing opposition forces towards the center-left. Not pushing them pushes center-left governments towards the center-right. While there may be occasional special circumstances to obviate these truisms, the general rule on democratization is more, much more.

4) Make the liberal center fulfil its theoretical preferences. This is otherwise known as forcing the pace of liberalism. The liberal center notably seldom means what it says, or practices what it preaches. Take some obvious themes, say, liberty. The liberal center used to denounce the Soviet Union regularly because it didn't permit free emigration. But of course the other side of free emigration is free immigration. There's no value in being allowed to leave a country unless you can get in somewhere else. We should push for open frontiers.

The liberal center regularly calls for freer trade, freer enterprise, keeping the government out of the market decisions that entrepreneurs are making. The other side of that is that entrepreneurs who fail in the market should not be salvaged. They take the profits when they succeed; they should take the losses when they fail. It is often argued that saving the companies is saving jobs. But there are far cheaper ways of saving jobs pay for unemployment insurance, retraining, and even starting job opportunities. But none of this needs involve assuming the debts of the failing entrepreneurs.

The liberal center regularly insists that monopoly is a bad thing. But the other side of that is abolishing or grossly limiting patents. The other side of that is not involving the government in protecting industries against foreign competition. Will this hurt the working classes in the core zones? Well, not if money and energy is spent on trying to achieve greater convergence of world wage rates.

The details of the proposition are complex and need to be discussed. The point however is not to let the liberal center get away with its rhetoric and reaping the rewards of that, while not paying the costs of its proposals. Furthermore, the most effective political mode of neutralizing centrist opinion is to appeal to its ideals, not its interests. Calling the claims on the rhetoric is a way of appealing to the ideals rather than the interests of the centrist elements.

Finally, we should always bear in mind that a good deal of the benefits of democratization are not easily available to the poorest strata, or not available to the same degree, because of the difficulties they have in navigating the bureaucratic hurdles. Some thirty years ago, Cloward and Piven proposed a mode of aiding the poorest strata. They said we should "explode the rolls," that is, mobilize in the poorest communities so that they take full advantage of their legal rights. (1 )

5) Make anti-racism the defining measure of democracy. Democracy is about treating all people equally - in terms of power, in terms of distribution, in terms of opportunity for personal fulfillment. Racism is the primary mode of distinguishing between those who have rights (or more rights) and the others who have no rights or fewer rights. Racism both defines the groups and simultaneously offers a specious justification for the practice. Racism is not a secondary issue, either on a national or a world scale. It is the mode by which the liberal center's promise of universalistic criteria is systematically, deliberately, and constantly undermined.

Racism is pervasive throughout the existing world-system. No corner of the globe is without it, and without it as a central feature of local, national, and world politics. In her speech to the Mexican National Assembly on Mar. 29, Commandant Esther of the EZLN said:

The Whites (ladinos) and the rich people make fun of us indigenous women for our clothing, for our speech, for our language, for our way of praying and healing, and for our color. which is the color of the earth that we work. (2)

She went on to plead in favor of the law that would guarantee autonomy to the indigenous peoples, saying:

When the rights and the culture of the indigenous peoples are recognized,...the law will begin to bring together its hour and the hour of the indigenous peoples.... And if today we are indigenous women, tomorrow we will the others, men and women, who are dead, persecuted, or imprisoned because of their difference.

6) Move towards decommodification. The crucial thing wrong with the capitalist system is not private ownership, which is simply a means, but commodification which is the essential element in the accumulation of capital. Even today, the capitalist world-system is not entirely commodified, although there are efforts to make it so. But we could in fact move in the other direction. Instead of transforming universities and hospitals (whether state-owned or private) into profit-making institutions, we should be thinking of how we can transform steel factories into non-profit institutions, that is, self-sustaining structures that pay dividends to no one. This is the face of a more hopeful future, and in fact could start now.

7) Remember always that we are living in the era of transition from our existing world-system to something different. This means several things. We should not be taken in by the rhetoric of globalization or the inferences about TINA. Not only do alternatives exist, but the only alternative that doesn't exist is continuing with our present structures.

There will be an immense struggle over the successor system, which shall continue for 20-40 years, and whose outcome is intrinsically uncertain. History is on no one's side. It depends on what we do. On the other hand, this offers a great opportunity for creative action. During the normal life of an historical system, even great efforts at transformation (so-called "revolutions") have limited consequences since the system creates great pressures to return to its equilibrium. But in the chaotic ambiance of a structural transition, fluctuations become wild, and even small pushes can have great consequences in favoring one branch or the other of the bifurcation. If ever agency operates, this is the moment.

The key problem is not organization, however important that be. The key problem is lucidity. The forces who wish to change the system so that nothing changes, so that we have a different system that is equally or even more hierarchical and polarizing, have money, energy, and intelligence at their disposal. They will dress up the fake changes in attractive clothing. And only careful analysis will keep us from falling into their many traps.

They will use slogans we cannot disagree with - say, human rights. But they will give it content which includes a few elements that are highly desirable with many others that perpetuate the “civilizing mission” of the powerful and privileged over the non-civilized others. If an international judicial procedure against genocide is desirable, then it desirable only if it is applicable to everyone, not merely the weak. If nuclear weapons, or biological warfare, are dangerous, even barbaric, then there are no safe possessors of such weapons.

In the inherent uncertainty of the world, at its moments of historic transformation, the only plausible strategy for the Global Left is one of intelligent, militant pursuit of its basic objective - the achievement of a relatively democratic, relatively egalitarian world. Such a world is possible. It is by no means certain that it will come into being. But then it is by no means impossible.

(1) Richard Cloward & Frances Fox Piven, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare, New York, Pantheon, 1971, p. 348.

(2 ) <http://www.ezln.org/marcha/20010320.htm>

Daya Varma (1929-2015)

SACW — 2015-04-04T13:41:34Z

Dr. Daya Varma, life-long communist, scientist, activist, dreamer, pharmacologist, professor emeritus at McGill University, Montreal, passed away on 22 March 2015 in St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada. A former member of the undivided Communist Party of India, he was a founder of Indian People's Association in North America (IPANA) and International South Asia Forum, as well as a founding member of CERAS (Centre d'Étude et Ressources d'Asie Sud) and was on the board of Alternatives, a progressive think tank in Canada.

He also founded and edited the INSAF bulletin. Many in India remember how when the 1984 Bhopal Union Carbide industrial disaster struck, where thousands died, Dr. Varma spearheaded a study to monitor the effects of MIC on pregnant women whilst supporting their compensation claims.

He was a long time supporter of sacw.net.

Some of his recent writings available via sacw are:

The Disappearing Left in the "Emerging" India by Dr. Daya Varma
http://www.sacw.net/article7407.html

India: CPM Should Learn from Late PC Joshi and Not from Mulayam Singh Yadav by Dr. Daya Varma, Vinod Mubayi, 2 December 2013
http://www.sacw.net/article6726.html

In memory of Sudarshan Punhani (1933-2009)

http://www.sacw.net/article920.html

Noted among his other writings are:

Book Review: Scanning P.C. Joshi's Biography
by Dr. Daya Varma in: Mainstream, Vol 47, 18 April 2009

From Witchcraft to Allopathy by Daya R Varma
in: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol - XLI No. 33, August 19, 2006

Books:

• Medicine, Healthcare and the Raj: The Unacknowledged Legacy by Daya Varma (2015) www.threeessays.com/books/medicine-healthcare-and-the-raj/

• Reason and Medicine: Art and science of healing from antiquity to modern times by Daya Ram Varma (January 2013)http://www.threeessays.com/books/reason-and-medicine/

Source: http://www.sacw.net/article10894.html