Alternatives International

Oslo Failed, Long Live Oslo

Nassar Ibrahim — 2013-10-02T00:21:32Z

This September marks the twentieth anniversary of the Oslo Accords. The Oslo I Accord represented the most comprehensive first step in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as it has culminated in the famous handshake between Yasser Arafat and Itzhak Rabin on the White House lawn under the proud gaze of Bill Clinton on September 13, 1993.

This interim agreement was designed to last five years, during which time the Israelis and Palestinians were to continue negotiations in order to resolve the most contentious issues of the conflict, namely, settlements, Jerusalem and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. While the accords formed the foundation of the means for self-government, i.e. the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), they did not, however, offer any significant assurances of independence, sovereignty or statehood.

Two decades later and no serious steps have been taken to ensure that the alleged intentions of the accords were fulfilled. Worse still for the Palestinians, the responsibility for the ensuing breakdown of permanent status negotiations was laid squarely and publicly at their feet, further fuelling the myth that Israel has no partner for peace.

In reality, however, the ultimate failure of Oslo in advancing a comprehensive peace process has its origins in the very basis of the process itself, particularly the insincere intentions of its two dominant actors: Israel and the United States.

The Oslo Accords were intended as a continuation of the road map for peace envisioned during the Madrid Conference in 1991, a year that saw increased regional and global instability and a significant weakening of the Palestinian side. With the collapse of the USSR - one of Palestine's most prominent supporters - the instability resulting from the events of the first Gulf War and the winding down of the First Intifada, Palestine was left with weakened allies and combat fatigue after four years of brutal Israeli military crackdowns in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza Strip.

It would be naïve, then, to believe it was a coincidence that the US felt this was the opportune moment to assert its increased global hegemony by leading an allegedly new and dynamic Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Oslo I, much like the preceding Madrid Conference, was, in reality, established upon the pre-condition of an unequal balance of power between the negotiating parties; with one side, the victor, setting conditions and demanding concessions from the defeated. The Oslo process also deviated significantly from previous approaches to negotiations, through the insistent focus on political processes of bartering and conditionality - typified by the oft-used slogan “land for peace” - rather than the frameworks of international law and existing UN resolutions.

Additionally, as the accords were formulated as an interim process, little focus was given to the key issues that characterize the conflict: settlements, Jerusalem and refugees, water and the economy. With these issues shelved, there were no mechanisms or incentives in place to ensure that Israel would abide by international law. On the contrary, Israel saw the opportunity to use the temporary status of the accords to establish more facts on the ground, thereby creating new and advantages realities on which to build any future peace process. With Israel's long-standing focus on security, the consequent creation of the PNA also afforded it the prospect of using the newly established Palestinian security and intelligence services for its own ends.

On the Palestinian side, the decision to participate in the negotiations was highly contested and laid the foundations for the debilitating political divisions that exist today, with Fatah and the Palestinian People's Party (PPP) advocating strongly in favor and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Hamas and Islamic Al-Jihad vocally against accords. This disunity and marginal representation of Palestinian political parties further weakened the Palestinian position in the talks and brought into question their legitimacy as representatives of the Palestinian populace.

In contrast to the lack of incentives offered to Israel to abide by international law, the US offered a number of economic enticements to the Palestinians in return for political concessions. These promises of economic development not only formed the basis of a number of the accords and protocols, but also served to silence the Palestinians on the more contentious issues.

After ratifying the concessions outlined in the accords, the Palestinians found themselves in a worse position than when they had entered the talks, with an increasingly isolated Jerusalem, almost unabated settlement expansion and deepening internal political divides. This apparent failure of the Oslo peace process was a significant contributing factor to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000.

Yet, in light of the obvious failure of Oslo Accords, the current round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, again mediated by the US, are based upon the same shaky foundations and questionable tactics that ignore key issues and side-step international law and UN resolutions. There is little hope of these talks succeeding where Oslo failed. As long as the US acts in unabashed bias towards Israeli interests over Palestinian rights, its role as host and mediator is nothing but perfunctory. And as long as Israel continues to negotiate as a dominant power instead of an equal, it will continue to pay the price for being an occupier.

Just and lasting peace will never be reached if the dominant parties continue to wield that dominance at the negotiating table. The US cannot currently be trusted to act objectively. For there to be any hope for future negotiations, other parties such as Russia, the Arab states and the EU must disregard US pressure and return to their traditional roles of checking the balances of power to ensure that the interests of all sides are being considered and valued equally.

In this context, the potential for success is predicated on the fact that the first step for any just and comprehensive agreement must first and foremost be based upon international law. Israel must be made to realize that international law and the relevant UN resolutions are independent and inviolable, and that the observance of these laws is in no way contingent upon the willingness of the occupied to make concessions to their oppressors.

For their part, the Palestinians must also change their approach to negotiations, firstly by forming strategies for genuine political unity and secondly, by realizing that these talks are not a matter of diplomacy, but a means of resistance and changing the balances of power on the ground. This is vital because the final results of any future agreement will ultimately reflect the balances of power established during talks.

With the current economic crisis and the ongoing global upheavals and shifts of power, it is crucial that the Palestinians seize the opportunities for new partnerships and co-operations, and ultimately strategize as to how these shifting realities can be used to their advantage.

Source: http://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php/politics/opinions/7031-oslo-failed-long-live-oslo

Palestinian Reconciliation: Conditions Required for Success

Nassar Ibrahim — 2011-06-01T17:21:20Z

The signing of the Palestinian reconciliation agreement is just the beginning of the internal reconciliation process on the national, political, strategic and tactical levels. Nassar Ibrahim writes that for reconciliation to be successful, two crucial conditions must be met.

The concept of reconciliation (sulha or musalaha in Arabic) immediately raises good connotations related to the positive social meaning this concept has in popular consciousness. Reconciliation is usually associated with daily differences and social tensions intertwined in the contexts of relations, overlapping interests and the relative positions of all involved. These differences and tensions might culminate in conflicts between and amongst circumscribed or wider social groups, such that once the reconciliation or sulha has been achieved through external or internal intervention, social life and relations return back to “normal” forms and principles. In this sense, reconciliation does not lead to a change of relationships, power balances or ethics of the group; its role in this case is instead to “re-harmonize” the existing structure with ongoing social contexts and disparities.

We hope that the Palestinian political reconciliation formally signed and celebrated in Cairo on 4 May 2011 does not go in this direction. The reasons that led to the Palestinian division, which lasted more than four years with all its negative consequences, as well as the questions and national challenges entailed in this reconciliation, are more complex and dangerous than the level of reconciliation, or sulha, conceived in its simplistic social and communal meaning.

One who believes that the mere signing of a reconciliation agreement means the end of contradictions between Fatah and Hamas is most mistaken. On the contrary, the signing of the reconciliation agreement puts the Palestinian political factions at the very beginning of the reconciliation process on the national, political, strategic and tactical levels. The value of this agreement must be understood in its implicit recognition of the failure and futility of factional options; it must also be considered a realisation of the fact that the political, social, economic and national challenges can be met only by a cohesive political actor. Fatah and Hamas did not solely give in to the pressure of the people's demands, but recognised the non-viability of the current political path and the weakness to which they had abandoned themselves.
The range of complacency and optimism that greeted the reconciliation reflects a satisfaction at the opportunity provided by the agreement for a conciliation process, although conditions for a real reconciliation have not been fully met. We are thus cautiously optimistic about the reconciliation, waiting for political actors to seize this fundamental opportunity and commence discussion of the most vital issues, such that we do not return to the same sectarianism and fragmented political framework after a few days or months.

The first of the conditions for success of reconciliation is a reevaluation and reconstruction of the Palestinian political strategy in order to regain a balance in accordance with national priorities on all levels. The re-evaluation must be based on the fact that the Palestinian people are still in the stage of national liberation, such that the political strategy should first and foremost serve this liberation, with all the attendant implications and priorities, including an interaction between the various forms of struggle. This requires a position far away from a compromise on Palestinian national goals and rights as a precondition for national unity.

It is imperative to identify clear boundaries between the goals of the Palestinian national liberation process and the functions of the Palestinian Authority, especially in light of the catastrophic consequences of the amalgamation of the two and the PA's cooptation of the liberation struggle in both its political and social aspects, with all the terrible cultural and moral consequences of this process.

Reconciliation is the opportunity for a fresh evaluation of the peace process and the political performance of the Palestinian leadership. An assessment in this context - especially after the long-term failure of the process under the pressure of American and Israeli conditions - will highlight the manifestations of the imbalances in the past two decades, as well as the necessity to cut with incorrect political choices and thus to regain the initiative in respect to national interests. Such a political reorientation is not anymore dictated solely by loyalty to the Palestinian cause; it became imperative after decades of compromises recently crowned by Obama's speeches to Congress and the American Israeli Public Affairs Commitee, which leave no hope for consistent change in the future assets of America foreign policy.

The second condition is to rebuild the Palestinian political bodies of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority in accordance not only with a new national strategy, but also with an evaluation of the evolving regional scenario, taking into account the impacts of the Arab revolutions and their role in promoting and re-framing the Palestinian national struggle in its Arab dimension, a dimension which has been deeply harmed by the Arab dictatorial regimes in the last decades. Furthermore the change in the internal balance of power and a pursuance of national efforts on the basis of democracy must be taken into consideration to ensure the participation of all Palestinian political and social forces according to their actual role on the ground.

A balance must accordingly be achieved between the functions of national liberation and the functions of social development, such that the latter is in tune and does not constitute an obstacle to liberation. A primary goal must be to escape from the trap of foreign funding, which has transformed into a field of political pressure.

The implementation of these major points will lead Palestinian political forces to face serious and dangerous national challenges. To not miss this opportunity implies not falling into narrow and selfish sectarian thinking. Every political force must work hard to meet the national challenge, which is first and foremost the ability to rebuild itself on all levels.

The process we are witnessing on the ground goes well beyond a political tightrope walk; it affects the very future of the Palestinian people and their national rights, which are the raison d'être of any Palestinian organization or party, whatever its history, authority or legitimacy might be.

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