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	<title>Alternatives International</title>
	<link>https://www.alterinter.org/</link>
	<description>We are social and political movements struggling against social injustices, neoliberalism, imperialism and war. We are building solidarity between social movements at the local, national and international level. More...</description>
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<item xml:lang="en">
		<title>Democracy Interrupted?</title>
		<link>https://www.alterinter.org/?Democracy-Interrupted</link>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.alterinter.org/?Democracy-Interrupted</guid>
		<dc:date>2008-03-18T23:30:00Z</dc:date>
		<dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
		<dc:language>en</dc:language>
		<dc:creator>S Akbar Zaidi</dc:creator>



		<description>&lt;p&gt;Pakistan has voted for a democratic future but Pervez Musharraf is &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
still in the spotlight. Washington is fully capable of converting &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
the victory of the people into a defeat by forcing a deal between &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
the new government and the former general. Another factor that will outline the contours of &#8220;democratisation&#8221; is the tradition in &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Pakistani politics of accommodating and compromising with the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
military.&lt;/p&gt;

-
&lt;a href="https://www.alterinter.org/?-Rainbow-of-Crisis-" rel="directory"&gt;Rainbow of Crisis&lt;/a&gt;


		</description>


 <content:encoded>&lt;div class='rss_chapo'&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pakistan has voted for a democratic future but Pervez Musharraf is &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
still in the spotlight. Washington is fully capable of converting &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
the victory of the people into a defeat by forcing a deal between &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
the new government and the former general. Another factor that will outline the contours of &#8220;democratisation&#8221; is the tradition in &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Pakistani politics of accommodating and compromising with the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
military.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		&lt;div class='rss_texte'&gt;&lt;p&gt;So what happened to the great democratic revolution which supposedly overturned retired general president Pervez Musharraf's cart on February 18? If, as all participants, observers and analysts &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
correctly believe, the elections of February 18 were an anti- &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Musharraf vote, in which the people of Pakistan signalled their &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
wish to put an end to the dispensation headed by the former general &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
since 1999 and wanted him gone, why is he still in power? The vote &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
went against not just the ruling Pakistan Muslim League's (Quaid-e- &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Azam) Shaukat Aziz, who made a very hasty retreat to safer and &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
more lucrative shores well before the votes were cast, but was a &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
resounding rejection of much of what Musharraf stood for and &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
propagated. Interestingly, this rejection did not include the people &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
rejecting Musharraf's notion of lifestyle liberalism, also known as &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
moderate enlightenment. The electorate signalled their wish not &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
just for a superficial notion of moderate enlightenment, but &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
importantly voted for a political liberalism as well, in which &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
basic rights related to some form of participation and &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
representation and were just as important as were liberal lifestyle &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
choices. The electorate rejected both fundamental- ism and &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
authoritarianism and the architecture that each endorsed and supported.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clearly, this was a particularly important vote and result by any &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
sense of imagination. Yet, why has the process for democratic &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
transition and/or transformation stalled? Is this merely because the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
elected mandate is split between the two largest parties and the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
idea of coalition politics is alien to Pakistan's politics, or is &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
there something far more sinister, substantive and powerful at &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
work? Or, as those who are taking a wait-and-see approach say, this &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
is merely how the new politics will be done? Perhaps the answer to &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
this and related questions lies in two separate spheres, both &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
overlapping. On the one hand, the domestic politics of compromise &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
and collaboration may continue to haunt the apparent victors of the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
February 18 elections for some time to come resulting in the process &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
of demcratisation slowing down. And on the other, Musharraf's &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
longevity may be very closely linked to support from the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
administration in Washington. Either way, Pakistan's democratic &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
transition is being curtailed and interrupted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Endorsing the Military&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The politics of Pakistan's political parties has been one largely of &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
compromise and collaboration with the military, by far the largest &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
and most prominent and powerful institution and organisation in the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
country. In each of the military coups that have taken place in the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
past, political actors have either asked the military to intervene &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
directly in the civilian dispensation or have endorsed the coup that &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
has taken place once the military has stepped into power. In 1977, &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
those political parties that were opposed to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
People's Party, including many who claimed to have secular roots, &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
pressed Zia-ul-Haq to intervene and dismiss Bhutto and hold fresh &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
elections after the polls earlier that year had been actively &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
rigged. Zia ful illed this request and ended up staying for 11 &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
years. Similarly, Musharraf too was welcomed in by opponents of Nawaz Sharif in 1999, and those who wanted him out were willing to &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
support a general coming to power. Moreover, even when not directly &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
in power as in the 1988-99 period, the military was constantly at &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
hand, being asked by politicians to intervene in the democratic and &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
political process. The dismissal, twice, of both the democratically &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
elected prime ministers in this period could not have come about &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
without sections of the ubiquitous military apparatus being &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
involved, often at the behest of political actors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Politics or democracy in Pakistan has seldom been immune to military &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
intervention and involvement. However, the responsibility for this &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
intrusion may not simply be that the military prefers to run &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Pakistan's politics because it feels that it knows best, but that &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
different breeds of politicians find opportunities to compromise &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
with and depend upon the military to get them into power. Political &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
parties in Pakistan have been more interested in coming to power &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
through any means at their disposal, rather than take the democratic &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
route to power. Musharraf, despite having lost the election in a &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
manner of speaking remains in power precisely because the former &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
leader of the People's Party put him into power. Her heirs are &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
bound by that arrangement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When Benazir Bhutto agreed to become Musharraf's prime minister by &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
agreeing to do a deal with him last July, she gave up all political &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
agency and abandoned, in fact sabotaged, a popular movement against the uniformed general in full force throughout 2007. Had Bhutto advised members of her party in Parliament to vote against the re- election of the uniformed president last year, and had she supported the various democratic struggles underway, Pakistan could have been a very different country than it is today. And, perhaps, Benazir Bhutto may also have been alive to savour a real political, and possibly, democratic transition in Pakistan. However, to think that &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
she would have taken a stand against the tradition of politics in &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Pakistan is naive. Access to power and its capture mattered far &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
more than how one got there.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is this compromise and collaboration by political actors that has &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
legitimised and even protected the role of Pakistan's military in &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
the political process in Pakistan. Hence, today, when sections of &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Pakistan's political actors and intelligentsia are demanding a &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
complete end to the continuation of military rule, uniformed or in &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
civilian guise, apologists for the more traditional form of doing &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
politics are urging caution, warning us not to squander the moment. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
This is perhaps the first time since 1968 that people have been brave &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
enough and clear enough to vote against the military and a general &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
in power, and yet the ex- tent of caution being urged at this moment &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
only plays into the hand of the former general and the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
&#8220;Establishment&#8221;. If political parties have largely been elected on &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
an anti-Musharraf ticket, why are the victors scared to press on? &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Why must they play this accommodating role? What are they waiting &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
for? Having won probably the fairest and freest elections since &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
1970, and like 1970, having won a decisive vote against the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
military and establishment order, the victors of 2008 have failed to &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
distinguish between the politics of democracy and the politics of &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
accommodation and collaboration. And, because of this, they have &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
failed to take the democratic order further, interrupting its &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
evolution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The American Imposition&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fact that the US has played an overly overt and active role in &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
ensuring Musharraf's longevity since 2001 cannot be denied. &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Statements since February 18 by the three senior most members of &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
the state department, Condoleezza Rice, John Negroponte and Richard Boucher have only reaffirmed Pakistan's changing status from a frontline state to that of a client state, where support for &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
Musharraf to continue as president has been crucial. For the Bush &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
administration, the lead role of Pakistan (Musharraf) in their war &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
against terrorism is far more important than is the verdict given &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
by the electorate of Pakistan demanding an end to the Musharraf &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
order, which may have helped the Americans but has also brought the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
war back home into the heartland of Pakistan. Probably another &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
reason why the Pakistani electorate wanted him out.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt; From the American point of view the desire to see Musharraf &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
continue in power is quite understandable. He is their man, running &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
their war. However, the fact that Pakistani political parties and &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
their leaders have to bow and tow the American line is less &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
understandable. Both Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif were paid &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
visits by the US ambassador in Islamabad regarding the American's &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
desire to see Musharraf continue. Both Pakistani leaders have been &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
forced to change their tune following the visits regarding their &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
desire to get rid of Musharraf. Hence Zardari's statements that his &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
party has no problem working with the obvious loser in the 2008 &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
elections. While the American position on Pakistan's future as a &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
democracy has always been suspect, one had hoped that the two &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
outright victors of the electoral process of 2008 would have shown &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
far greater democratic credentials than they have.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The events, processes and intrigues underway since February 18, &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
suggest that what has been squandered has been the moment to press forward with Pakistan's democracy, not to pause and interrupt it. The 2008 elections are the first in almost 40 years where democracy seems to have triumphed over the ubiquitous, omni- present, military state and its establishment. The fact that Pakistan's politicians have not understood this is a sad reflection of the state of politics and of &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
democracy in Pakistan. Further compromise, collaboration and &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
accommodation with the military and its masters will only delay the &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
process of democratisation in Pakistan. While some important &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
transition will certainly take place over the next few days and &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
weeks, perhaps the moment to push forward with more, not less, &lt;br class='autobr' /&gt;
democracy may have been lost.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First published in Economic and Political Weekly in March 2008&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
		
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