On October 4, 2026, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, candidate of the Liberal Party (PL) and its far-right coalition, finished the first round of Brazil’s presidential election with 47.03 per cent of the valid votes. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, candidate of the Workers’ Party (PT) and its centre-left coalition, received 45.16 per cent, according to the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the branch of the judiciary that runs Brazilian elections. In the run-off on October 25, Lula was re-elected with 51.79 per cent of the valid votes: 64,256,232 against 59,826,041. We write with joy, and we write to contest the explanation of this victory, because the use the democratic camp makes of the next four years depends on it.
Arithmetic and electoral history pointed to a Flávio Bolsonaro victory. Since 1989, when Brazil returned to electing its president by direct vote in two rounds, no candidate who finished second in the first round had ever won the run-off. On that same October 4, the PL and its far-right coalition emerged from the polls with the largest caucuses in the National Congress and in the state legislative assemblies, (the Brazilian counterparts of Canada’s provincial legislatures), as well as with the largest number of governorships. The PL alone won 121 of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 24 more than in 2022, and will hold 28 of the 81 seats in the Senate from 2027, the largest caucus in both houses. It also elected 212 state and Federal District legislators, forming the largest caucus in nine state assemblies and in the Legislative Chamber of the Federal District, among them those of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. It won six of the 27 governorships, more than any other party. The PT won four.
Arithmetic and electoral history pointed to a Flávio Bolsonaro victory.
We hold that the Bolsonaro family, at the head of the PL and its far-right coalition, is the Brazilian embodiment of twenty-first-century fascism. Jair Bolsonaro, Flávio’s father, governed the country from 2019 to 2022 and is now serving a prison sentence for attempting a coup d’état. This fascism does not reproduce the single party or the mass militias of the interwar years. It works inside democratic institutions in order to hollow them out, organizes itself through digital networks and preserves the old core: the cult of the leader, the manufacture of internal enemies and the legitimation of violence. In an interview with the Uruguayan newspaper la diaria, published on October 21, one of us argued that attacks on Brazilian schools are organized by right-wing extremism and that their victims are invariably women. On election night, Flávio Bolsonaro declared it impossible to recognize the result. In 2022, Jair Bolsonaro never explicitly conceded defeat, and on January 8, 2023, his supporters stormed and vandalized the buildings of Congress, the presidency and the Supreme Court in Brasília. The script remains in force.
Lula, the PT and its centre-left coalition are children of the twentieth century. Lula rose to prominence through the workers’ strikes in São Paulo’s industrial belt in the late 1970s, the PT was founded in 1980, and the repertoire of Brazil’s democratic camp took shape in the struggle against the military dictatorship (1964-1985) and in the National Constituent Assembly: the mass party, the trade union, the organized movement, the winning of rights through institutional channels. That repertoire defeated the dictatorship and wrote the 1988 Constitution. The far right, however, reached the twenty-first century before we did. While the PL and its coalition were learning to mobilize emotion in real time, through digital communities without a centre, the PT and its centre-left coalition went on campaigning with the tools of the twentieth century: a leadership that decides from above what activists will repeat, the campaign office with fixed hours, the bet on television airtime.
The first round exacted its price. In Brazil, voting is compulsory between the ages of 18 and 70, and optional for 16- and 17-year-olds and for those over 70 (Federal Constitution, art. 14, § 1). Abstention reached 21.08 per cent of the electorate, the highest since 1998. The president of the TSE, Justice Kassio Nunes Marques, reported that among voters for whom voting is optional, absence was close to 50 per cent among those over 70 and around 20 per cent among 16- and 17-year-olds. The young had gone to the polls. Their grandparents, for the most part, had stayed home.
In the three weeks that followed, young people opened the doors of the twenty-first century for us. In our view, they wrested control of the electoral campaign from the bureaucratic leadership of the PT and its centre-left coalition: they set the language, chose the terrain and treated voting as a family undertaking. The decisive terrain was the kitchen table, the family group chat and the neighbourhood sidewalk, where granddaughters and grandsons persuaded their grandparents that this election belonged to them too. The leadership followed behind.
Young people carried us to victory. A battle of capital importance has been won, but we are far from winning the war against fascism
Sunday’s figures are consistent with this reading. Abstention fell to 19.22 per cent, a drop of 1.86 percentage points. In 2022, the decline between rounds had been 0.36 points, from 20.95 to 20.59 per cent. Lula gained 10.4 million votes between the two rounds and Flávio Bolsonaro 3.7 million, according to calculations by Genial Investimentos based on TSE data. The political scientist Rodrigo Mahlmeister, of Duke University, attributed the reversal to the campaign’s wager on mobilizing older voters, including people who had not voted in many years (BBC News Brasil, October 26, 2026). In his victory speech, Lula thanked the young people who took to the streets and acknowledged the determination of older voters to cast their ballots. The TSE has not yet published second-round turnout by age group, and definitive proof of the mechanism we describe depends on those figures.
PT leaders attribute the victory to fear of Flávio Bolsonaro. The fear was real: in January 2026, a Genial/Quaest poll found that 46 per cent of voters were more afraid of the Bolsonaro family’s return to power, against 40 per cent who were more afraid of a continued Lula government. That fear was already present on October 4, and it did not prevent defeat in the first round. What changed between the rounds was the presence of someone willing to turn a grandfather’s fear into a ballot cast. Fear without mobilization produces abstention.
Young people carried us to victory. A battle of capital importance has been won, but we are far from winning the war against fascism: from 2027, the PL and its far-right coalition will hold the largest caucuses in the National Congress and in nine state assemblies, along with the largest number of governorships. Democratic forces must become less institutionalist, because twenty-first-century fascism grew inside the institutions, and rules, courts and agreements among elites proved insufficient to contain it. They must stop managing neoliberalism. As long as Brazil’s fiscal rule (Complementary Law 200/2023) caps the real growth of federal primary spending at 70 per cent of real revenue growth, governments led by the PT and its centre-left coalition will go on administering the scarcity that the far right converts into resentment. And they must build new alternatives with those who opened the doors of the twenty-first century, giving young people a seat in the bodies that set the course of the democratic camp.
Fear without mobilization produces abstention.
Young people are also carrying the French left into the twenty-first century. In the snap legislative elections of 2024, called after the Rassemblement National’s victory in the European elections, 48 per cent of voters aged 18 to 24 backed the Nouveau Front Populaire, the alliance of the left, in the first round, compared with 18 per cent of those over 70, according to Ipsos Talan. If bureaucratic leadership regains control, in Brazil or in France, we will slide back into the twentieth century, and our adversary will be waiting for us in the twenty-first.
* Daniel Cara , 48, is a professor at the University of São Paulo (USP) School of Education. He ran for the Brazilian Federal Senate in 2018, receiving 440,118 votes, and is a member of the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL). He is the Honorary Coordinator of the Brazilian Campaign for the Right to Education.
Andressa Pellanda , 36, holds a PhD in International Relations and is the General Coordinator of the Brazilian Campaign for the Right to Education. She is a feminist and a full member of Brazil’s National Education Forum.
Both authors are founding members of the recently established Global Solidarity Against Fascism (GSAF), whose secretariat is in Montreal, Canada.
26 October 2026











