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Home > English > NEWS AND ANALYSIS > The Future Will Be Contradictory

SPECIAL FEATURE

The Future Will Be Contradictory

Tuesday 19 August 2025, by Alternatives international

Interview with Gus Massiah by Catherine Tricot was published in Revue Regards on February 6, 2025

Catherine Tricot: How do you understand these tumultuous times?

Gustave Massiah: We are in a moment of structural crisis in the capitalist mode of production, a change in historical period that goes far beyond the election of Donald Trump. Even if Trump’s election dramatically changes the situation and introduces new uncertainties. Social, ecological, and democratic issues are being challenged and disrupted, and are being redefined at different levels: local, national, regional, and global. We are in a period of rupture, of structural crisis in the capitalist mode of production, but this does not mean an end to capitalism.

What are these disruptions that allow you to talk about a rupture?

I would say: decolonization and the rise of the South; ecology; democracy; and finally, new social relationships, particularly with regard to digital technology.

One initial consequence is that social classes are changing, starting with the financial bourgeoisie. Trump, Milei, and Musk have lost all sense of proportion, and this is the first time we have seen such a violent assertion of the power of billionaires. The productive class is also in turmoil with the transformation of work and skills. And, on a global scale and in every society, the rise of the working poor and the middle class.

A second consequence, linked to ecology, is the crisis of productivism. Class changes and the crisis of productivism are reflected in the rise of social movements that are both complementary and alternative to social classes: the women’s movement, ecology, anti-racism, immigration, indigenous peoples, housing and the city, and education.

These factors lead me to say that we are in a period of historic change, of crisis in the mode of production.

Is the rise of the far right around the world a reaction to these changes?

Yes, in part. But not only that. The rise of the far right is partly due to fear and rejection of social movements that are disrupting the dominant ideology. When Trump attacks women and trans people, he is violently expressing his fear of these changes.

To understand the rise of the far right, I asked myself what had happened in previous changes and crises in the capitalist mode of production. I realized that all the structural crises of the capitalist mode of production began with a rise of the far right, followed by responses from the left and then by a transformation of capitalism. This timing of crises is very striking.

To identify the crises of the capitalist mode of production, we can start with the structural financial crises of 1873, 1929, 1976, and 2008. Each financial crisis marks a rupture; it is the culmination of a period of crisis lasting twenty to forty years, with its social, ideological, and cultural struggles, often accompanied by wars.

The crisis of 1873 was followed by the Long Depression, which lasted from 1873 to 1896. It marked the transition from liberal capitalism to monopoly capitalism with the emergence of large industrial groups, significant intervention by banks, and the development of financial capitalism. The period began with the extreme right (and with Patrice de MacMahon in France) and continued, till around 1890, with the emergence of the new extreme right (with Charles Maurras in France). However, it was during this crisis that the First International was created in London in 1864 and the Paris Commune in 1871. These were the left-wing responses to this crisis of capitalism. This crisis continued with the second industrial revolution, from 1880 to 1914, which saw the rise of electricity, oil, and chemicals.

The second major crisis was the financial crisis of 1929; the great crisis, which began in 1914 and ended in 1945, included two world wars. It was marked by the rise of fascism. But it also saw the rise of the Popular Front. It continued with Fordism, a new form of capitalism that emerged after the Second World War and dominated until 1976.

"I realized that all the structural crises of the capitalist mode of production began with a rise of the far right, followed by responses from the left and then by a transformation of capitalism"

The third major financial crisis began in 1973 with the oil crisis and the financial crash of 1976. With Pinochet’s coup in Chile in 1973 and dictatorships in several countries, neoliberalism was experimented with and imposed. This was combined with the rise of the South. In 1989, the end of the Soviet Union led to the belief in the “end of history” and the victory and eternity of capitalism. But the 2008 crisis disproved this false certainty and ushered in the crisis of neoliberalism.

The 2008 crisis came as a surprise to all those who believed in “the end of history” and the definitive victory of capitalism. The Indignados movements, Occupy, the Arab revolutions, social forums, and even the Tunisian uprising of 2015 initiated a left-wing response to this new financial crisis. Then came regression with repression.

The current rise of the far right is therefore not an exceptional phenomenon. It is part of the major sequences of change in capitalism. But it is always accompanied by a left-wing response and a transformation of capitalism.

That’s comforting optimism?

Yes, absolutely. The responses from the left have not yet been completely successful, but they are changing the future. For example, after World War II, there was a Fordist transformation that gave way to new balances in class relations and international relations.

We can draw a first conclusion from this: the future is not written in stone and will be contradictory. The outcomes of crises will be contradictory. There will be no perfect future and no definitive resolution of contradictions. Nor will there be absolute catastrophe, even if wars are possible.

Let’s return to the characteristics of our historical moment. You introduce an unexpected dimension, the decolonial factor.

Indeed, I believe that one of the major characteristics of the current situation is that decolonization is not complete. In 1927, in Brussels, we had a very important stage in decolonization movement. It was the meeting of the League Against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression, attended by Nehru, Ho Chi Minh, and Messali Hadj; and as honorary members, Mrs. Sun Yat Sen, widow of the first Chinese president, and Albert Einstein. In 1927, the rise of independence movements accelerated with Nehru and Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, with the founding of the Indonesian Congress Party by Sukarno and national movements in the Maghreb and the rest of Africa. It was a high point in the international expression of decolonization.

This movement found its full expression at the 1955 Bandung Conference, which brought together the first decolonized, independent countries of Africa and Asia. Sukarno, who hosted Nehru, Chou En Lai, and Nasser, opened the meeting. Chou En Lai made the following statement, which remains relevant today: “States want their independence, nations want their liberation, peoples want revolution.” He linked state, nation, and people in a strong complementarity, but with great complexity and even ambiguity. Thus, the United Nations Declaration, that is, the declaration of nations, begins with “We the peoples,” but in fact it is states that sit in the UN and make up the United Nations.

The first phase of decolonization was indeed that of state independence. It is now almost complete, except for Palestine and the 23 colonies listed by the United Nations, including New Caledonia and Western Sahara. We are therefore moving from the first phase of decolonization to the second: nations want their liberation. The question of nationalism is no longer limited to the nation-state and nations defined by states. It raises questions of identity and sovereignty. This is clearly seen in the way the far right emphasizes national identity and the nature of the state, based on a historical reinterpretation of identities. This new phase of decolonization begins with the rise of identity-based nationalism. It is reflected in the centrality of the question of migration.

Are you saying that the decoupling of the nation and the state relativizes the place of politics in favor of identity?

The definition of the nation becomes primordial. This is not necessarily extreme right-wing. But it explains the new rise of nationalism. We can understand why the United States is so fixated on a definition of the white American nation, even for those who are not white. The questioning of birthright citizenship in France and the United States is part of this movement to (re)define the nation. Previously, the issues revolved around the question of the state and the definition of politics that followed from it.

In the French case, politics and identity are linked insofar as, with the Revolution, citizenship became the foundation of the French nation. The place of migrants—non-citizens—has greatly disrupted this definition of French identity. In all surveys of French people, the issue of migration does not emerge as a key issue, but it is taken up in political debate as the key issue. This is a way for the right or the far right to build a new nationalism. We need to find a left-wing response and look at how to frame the question of identity differently, as a way of building society and inventing a common identity. We must find common identities that take into account origins and a common culture without falling into nationalist exclusions. The issue of migration must start from an understanding of the state of the world and not from identities.

Two major factors in the state of the world that characterize the nature of migration must be considered in this discussion. The first is the transformation of the rural world and sedentary lifestyles. Since Mesopotamia, some 5,000 years ago, the sedentary population was the agricultural population. This is no longer the case. Today, the agricultural population accounts for less than 5% of the population in Europe, North America, and Japan. It is between 15% and 40%, and declining, in China, South America, and India; and already less than 50% in Africa and Southeast Asia. The sedentary population in rural areas, including the agricultural population, still plays an important role, particularly a symbolic one. But urban populations are evolving differently. This is causing very strong differences between cities and rural areas, which are reflected, for example, in differences in voting patterns between cities and rural areas. Migration, whether rural exodus or international migration, plays a major role in urban cultures.

"We need to find a left-wing response and look at how to frame the question of identity differently"

Another major factor affecting the population today is mass education. This is also a global phenomenon. In France, 80% of the younger generation has a high school diploma. In Congo Kinshasa, in 1960, at the time of independence, there were three high school graduates, two of whom were in Brussels. In 2021, there were 328,000 high school graduates in Congo Kinshasa. Migrants, like the global population, are increasingly skilled; migration will shape the world and is the foundation of the new global culture. This upheaval is incredible, and we don’t know what the outcome will be. It is understandable that it may raise fears; it affects economic relations, particularly between North and South, as well as demographic and cultural relations. The second phase of decolonization is not only the end of Western domination of the South, but also the qualitative evolution of the world’s population.

How does this new situation change our thinking about relations between states, between North and South, and international law?

This phase of decolonization raises an important question: that of the relationship between colonized peoples and colonizing peoples. I asked myself this question in relation to the situation between Palestine and Israel. Does decolonization mean the departure of the colonizers?

When we consider the possible situations following decolonization, we find that historically there are three situations that characterize the relationship between colonized peoples and colonizing peoples. In the first situation, the colonizing peoples annihilate the colonized peoples. This was the case in North America, Australia, New Zealand... at least that was the idea. But contrary to what was thought, the indigenous peoples did not disappear; they were reborn and today are reaffirming their presence. Second scenario: the colonized peoples gain their independence and the colonizers leave because they cannot tolerate independence or because they are expelled. This is what happened during the period of decolonization and independence, for example in Algeria, Vietnam, and many other countries.

Are there other situations? Historically, there have been other situations of cohabitation, difficult and contradictory, but which open up new perspectives. I would cite three: Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa. The first example is Mexico. It is dominated economically but not politically. Mexico managed to avoid the situation of the Native Americans during the conquest of the United States. Mexico could have been colonized like the United States; it was economically dominated, but it managed to avoid colonization and build its political independence.

The second example is Brazil. Decolonization was not led by the indigenous people but by another colonized people, the former black slaves. Over the past 30 years, there has been a transformation, an extraordinary mixing of races. Brazil is one of the hypotheses of the current globalization.

Mexico, Brazil, South Africa: in these three large and very diverse countries the colonizers and the colonized are living together on the same land. We can therefore say to the Israelis, “Under certain conditions, which must be worked out together with the Palestinians, you can stay.” A two-state solution for Palestine and Israel remains possible; it is difficult to imagine in the immediate future, but it remains possible. And it would allow for the preparation of more viable solutions. For example, a region or confederation bringing together Palestine, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon. In the more distant future, and if the future moves towards large regions, including but not limited to the current forms of nation states, there could be a large region comprising Syria, Iraq, and perhaps even Egypt. All these countries have a shared history and a common language and culture.

Do you agree with the idea of recreating large empires?

Not at all, the future does not repeat the past. I think we are moving towards large regions made up of countries that have histories, geographies, and a possible future that connect them. These regions will bring together states that are not nation states. In Asia, there are three or four large regions: the greater Chinese region, the greater Indian region, Southeast Asia, and finally Japan and Korea. There is also the Pacific. There is North America. In South America, there is Central America with Mexico and the countries surrounding it. Brazil and Argentina with Chile, together or not. The question of language is significant. Finally, the Caribbean is also united by history and culture. The Middle East is a region undergoing reconstruction that could escape the conflicts and wars being waged there. Similarly, in Africa, there are four major regions: North Africa, which is more or less connected to the Middle East, West and Central Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. Europe; Russia and one or two other European regions.

Some twenty large regions that would reshape the space of the 195 states without eliminating them. This evolution will take time, as did the transition from empires to nation states. One of the most important areas of work is international law, which is being challenged by nationalist far-right movements and must be defended, renewed, and advanced.

What about internationally recognized borders?

In my opinion, the evolution of nation states towards larger regions is a structural evolution. We can keep borders and states; however, we must move beyond the nation state as the exclusive form of historical identity. Some places are more advanced in this evolution.

Europe is institutionally more advanced, but its structural difficulties are significant. It is a mosaic of languages and memories of war. Russia must build trust with Europe and find common projects that go beyond a capitalist common market and the quest for dominance. On the other hand, in the Middle East, Iran, Turkey, and Arab countries can build a common space. History has not yet been written.

"Some twenty large regions that would reshape the space of the 195 states without eliminating them"

In a period of change such as the one we are currently experiencing, marked by a historic crisis in the capitalist mode of production, contradictions are becoming more acute. This is particularly true of the contradictions of globalized capitalism. These contradictions include ecology versus productivism, democracy versus authoritarianism, new modes of production, and digital technology. Movements are becoming more radical, such as the women’s movement, the ecology movement, the anti-racism movement, the immigration movement, the indigenous peoples’ movement, the housing and urban movement, and the education movement.

There is no strategy for the progress of capitalism today. In the absence of a strategy, authoritarians and billionaires such as Trump, Milei, Modi, and Musk are given free reign. The only freedom tolerated is that of capital. The very idea of democracy is being challenged and fought against. Anti-globalization is confronted with renewed globalization that promotes nationalism and the return of sovereignty. To renew anti-globalization, we must take up the proposal of Edouard Glissant and Patrick Chamoiseau and oppose worldliness to globalization.

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