Log in
Sudan’s war is far from a binary struggle; it is a conflict where a web of local, regional, and global interests and tensions have converged into a single, devastating catastrophe. What observers initially framed as a ‘war between two generals’ or a domestic struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has proven to be merely the surface layer of a much more complex and shifting reality.
A Multidimensional Conflict
Initial interpretations of the war’s origins framed it either as a desperate bid by the Bashir-era Islamist old guard to reclaim power, or as a preemptive coup by the RSF to seize control of the state. However, the conflict quickly revealed a sub-imperial dimension. The UAE’s substantial support for the RSF is increasingly viewed as an Emirati strategic project aimed at securing hegemony over Sudan’s resources and shaping its political future. Conversely, supporters of the RSF/UAE point to Egypt as the primary architect behind the SAF, arguing that Cairo is determined to install a military-aligned ruler to prevent a democratic transition that might destabilize regional autocracies.
Despite these competing narratives, a singular, counter-revolutionary thread binds them. At its core, this war serves as a mechanism to dismantle the democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people, aspirations that were ignited during the December 2018 revolution and led to the ousting of Omar al-Bashir’s three-decade dictatorship in April 2019.
The Saudi-Emirati Divergence: From Alignment to Rivalry
While few initially described this as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the rift between these two Gulf powers has emerged as one of the conflict’s central geopolitical features. For a long period, the UAE’s resources and its determination to back the RSF went unmatched, even as the RSF committed systematic and well-documented atrocities across all areas it occupied. During this phase, it seemed clear that Sudan did not hold the same priority on Riyadh’s agenda as it did on Abu Dhabi’s.
This dynamic shifted as the Quad group, comprising the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, proved too divided to function shortly after its formation in September 2025. Saudi Arabia began to view the RSF’s rise through the lens of national security. The prospect of a UAE-aligned militia ruling a country situated just 290 km (180 miles) across the Red Sea from Jeddah is now viewed in Riyadh as a direct threat to its domestic stability and to its envisioned regional order in the Red Sea basin.
Geopolitical Fracture: Two Strategic Visions
This divergence reflects broader Saudi-Emirati tensions that have surfaced in recent years across multiple theaters, ranging from Yemen to oil policy within OPEC+. The two Gulf powers are seen to increasingly pursue distinct strategic visions. Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), has prioritized regional stability to create an environment conducive to the economic transformation envisioned under Vision 2030. In contrast, the UAE has pursued a more activist, network-based foreign policy. This approach often involves working through non-state armed actors, including militias like the RSF, to secure strategic leverage over ports, territory, and gold mines across Africa.
Furthermore, Riyadh increasingly views Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza and its broader regional aggressions as a threat to overall regional stability. This shift has prompted Saudi Arabia to reconsider its regional relationships and to view the UAE’s deepening ties with Israel with growing suspicion. From Riyadh’s perspective, this partnership now represents a potential destabilizing axis affecting Red Sea security and complicating its delicate de-escalation process with Iran.
New Facets: Drones and Training Camps
Two recent investigative reports by The New York Times and Reuters have provided the concrete evidence that brings these international interventions into the open:
Egypt’s Direct Operational Role: The New York Times report indicates that Egypt has been operating Turkish-made combat drones from a covert airbase in its Western Desert near the Sudanese border, marking a clear shift from political and logistical support to direct military intervention in Sudan’s war. This escalation suggests that Cairo views the RSF’s territorial advances as a strategic “red line,” particularly in relation to Nile water security and border stability. That red line appears to have been crossed when the RSF seized control of the strategic border triangle linking Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, and later occupied El-Fasher, consolidating dominance across much of the Darfur region.
Ethiopia as a New Frontier: The Reuters report reveals that Ethiopia has established a secret training camp near the Sudanese borders to prepare thousands of RSF fighters. It indicates that the UAE financed the facility and provided trainers and logistical support. This shift by Ethiopia from political and logistical backing to direct military involvement represents a troubling escalation. Such a move risks expanding the conflict and destabilizing an already fragile region. By exacerbating tensions with Tigray and Eritrea and heightening the risk of confrontation between Ethiopia and both Sudan and Egypt, it threatens to transform Sudan’s war into a catalyst for wider regional crises.
The Grim Consequence: An Internationalized War
The consequence for Sudan is an increasingly entrenched and internationalized war. As external actors deepen their involvement, the prospects for a purely Sudanese political solution diminish, leaving the nation’s fate at the mercy of geopolitical trade-offs and compromises that have little to do with Sudan itself. This ‘outsourcing’ of the crisis often relies on deals with Sudanese elites who do not represent the people’s aspirations. Such a path marginalizes Sudanese citizens, the true owners of the state and the primary victims of the violence, and threatens to relegate the 2018 revolutionary slogans of “Freedom, Peace, and Justice” to a fading memory.
Husam Mahjoub is an engineer of Sudanese origin based in Austin, Texas, USA. He is a co–founder of Sudan Bukra, an independent non-profit Sudanese TV channel.
This article first appeared on the Left Renewal Blog.
15 February 2026
